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And the old man let his scanty tears 
dry upon his cheeks and they made 
salty stains there. And he stooped and 
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held it and he muttered: ‘If you sell the 
land, it is the end.’
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In June, the government of the United States 
announced its intention to withdraw from the 
Paris Accords, severely undermining the global 
effort to contain climate change. Since then, 
China has entered the fray, attempting to portray 
itself as a world leader on environmental issues. 
Considering that China is currently the largest 
emitter of greenhouse gases, this development 
might appear paradoxical. Nevertheless, in 
recent years the Chinese authorities have 
become increasingly concerned with the toll 
that environmental catastrophes are taking 
on the health of the country’s citizens, as this 
has the potential to spark unrest that could 
negatively affect governmental legitimacy. The 
‘airpocalypses’ that have hit major Chinese 
cities and the ‘cancer villages’, where disease 
has spread due to soil and water pollution 
caused by industries, are just two instances of 
major environmental scandals that have made 
the headlines in China over the years. It is 
in light of this crisis—and also in an attempt 
to capitalise on environmental protection 
economically—that the Chinese leadership 
has been pushing forward ambitious plans for 
‘environmental rejuvenation’, which include 
new policies and massive investments in 
renewable energies. 
While global attention has focussed on China’s 
top-down environmental efforts, in this issue 
of Made in China we consider the engagement 
of Chinese citizens with state policies on the 
environment, and look into their potential for 
articulating workable grassroots alternatives. 
In particular, we examine the management of 
public resources—the so-called ‘commons’. In A 
Chinese Water Commons?, Andrea Pia argues 
that there are places in rural China where water 
is already being managed as a commons. In 
Amateurism and Our Common Concern for 
Biodiversity, Timothy McLellan outlines his 
experience with a project aimed at introducing 
biologically diverse agroforestry in a county in 
southwest China, and puts forward a critique of 
professionalisation in the realm of international 
environmental cooperation. In Commons 
and the Right to the City in Contemporary 
China, Carlo Inverardi-Ferri tells the story of 
an urban village on the outskirts of Beijing, 
providing insights into the process of land 
commodification in today’s China. In Burning 
Coal in Tangshan, Edwin Schmitt traces the 
history of coal mining in China, highlighting 
the nexus between the physical characteristics 
of energy resources and the development of the 
rules that govern them. Finally, in Protecting 
Sacred Commons, Brendan Galipeau explores 
how some Tibetan communities engaging 
in viticulture in northwest Yunnan province 
pursue an ecologically friendly agenda meant to 
protect ‘common’ Buddhist sacred landscapes.
This issue also includes essays related to 
labour and civil society. In What Future 
Is There for Human Rights Lawyering in 
China?, Fu Hualing analyses the practices of 
Chinese human rights lawyers and examines 
the prospects for their survival in Xi Jinping’s 
era. In Slaving Away, Ivan Franceschini looks 
back at the ‘black brick kilns scandal’ that took 
place in China ten years ago and attempts to 
draw some lessons from those horrific stories of 
forced labour. In China’s Industrial Heritage 
without History, Maris Boyd Gillette examines 
the public memory of China’s socialist industrial 
heritage. In our cultural section, Chen Shuxia 
retraces the life of the late photographer Ren 
Hang, who committed suicide earlier this 
year. We conclude by interviewing Christian 
Sorace about his new book on the 2008 Sichuan 
Earthquake, Shaken Authority.
This journal is hosted by Chinoiresie.info. If 
you would like to contribute a piece of writing, 
please contact us; to receive this journal 
regularly by email, please subscribe to our 
mailing list. 
The Editors
The Good Earth
In Search of the Chinese 
Commons
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Amnesty International 
Releases Report on Death 
Penalty in China
In April, Amnesty released a report on the death 
penalty in China entitled ‘China’s Deadly Secrets’. 
In spite of the nearly absolute secrecy over the 
Chinese death penalty system, Amnesty estimates 
that in 2016 China carried out more executions 
than all other countries combined. The Report also 
objects to the unverifiable claims by the Chinese 
government that the country has been ‘killing 
fewer, killing cautiously’ (shaosha shensha). To 
The Guardian, Amnesty International East Asia 
Director Nicholas Bequelin explained that without 
concrete statistics there is no way to verify such 
claims, and demanded China to ‘stop being a rogue 
state in the international community with respect 
to the death penalty and finally allow the Chinese 
people to have a proper, informed debate about 
capital punishment in the country.’ Commenting 
on the Report for The New York Times, Professor 
Susan Trevaskes, an expert on the death penalty in 
China, claimed that the number of people executed 
annually is probably in the ‘low thousands’ and that 
the Chinese government has significantly reduced 
the use of capital punishment since the mid-2000s. 
According to the Report, a partial dataset of cases 
shows that farmers and the unemployed constitute 
the majority of people given death sentences. EN
(Sources: Amnesty International Global Report; 
Amnesty International China Report; The 
Guardian; Quartz; The New York Times)
Beijing Offers Rewards for 
Reporting Spies
On 10 April, the Beijing State Security Bureau 
released a set of Measures on Rewards for Citizens 
Reporting Leads on Espionage Conduct. These 
regulations promise informants who report on 
spies rewards ranging between ten thousand 
and five hundred thousand yuan, depending on 
the relevance and usefulness of the information 
provided. The new regulations have been 
accompanied by the online publication of a cartoon 
in which a young boy donning the red scarf of a 
Communist Young Pioneer reports a bearded 
foreigner wearing a bandit’s mask. This is not the 
first sign of an increasing concern with matters of 
national security among the Chinese leadership. 
Back in 2013, President Xi Jinping established a 
new, secretive National Security Commission of 
the Communist Party of China in an apparently 
successful attempt to consolidate the political 
leadership of all the components of a fragmented 
security apparatus. In November 2014, the Chinese 
government passed a Counter-espionage Law, 
followed a few months later by a National Security 
Law. In November 2015, Jilin province was the 
first to introduce a hotline for residents to report 
possible spies. Since the passing of the National 
Security Law, the Chinese government has declared 
15 April ‘National Security Education Day’, i.e. 
a day for raising public awareness of national 
security issues. In 2016, the day was marked by 
the appearance of a sixteen-panel cartoon poster 
entitled ‘Dangerous Love’ on the public bulletin 
boards of local governments. This comic told the 
story of an attractive young Chinese civil servant 
who meets a redheaded foreign man posing as 
a visiting scholar and starts a relationship with 
him, only to find out later that he is a spy. That 
these concerns remain paramount to the Chinese 
leadership was also highlighted by the unusually 
brief round of discussions that preceded the 
adoption of the new National Intelligence Law—
which regulates the activities of state security 
bodies—on 27 June.  IF
(Sources: China Law Translate 1; China Law 
Translate 2; Reuters; The New York Times 1; The 
New York Times 2; The Paper)
APR/JUN
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Salaries of Executives in 
State-Owned Enterprises 
Linked to Party-Building 
Effort
On 17 April, Premier Li Keqiang told a meeting 
of top state-owned enterprise (SOE) executives 
at the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission in Beijing that the 
government was reconsidering a 2015 policy 
capping their pay, and promised more competitive 
rates tied to performance. According to a Xinhua 
report, executives’ pay and other rewards 
or punishments will be linked to how well 
individuals carry out ‘Party building’ work. This 
is part of the government’s attempt to reform SOE 
management in order to restructure, modernise, 
and internationalise the state sector. The latest 
news is seen as an effort to re-establish the role 
of the Party in China’s state industry, and retain 
loyal and talented managers. Since 2013, President 
Xi Jinping has been pushing for China’s state 
sector—whose worth is estimated at twenty trillion 
American dollars—to embrace structural reforms 
while reining in state sector managers’ pay. This 
year, China is about to restart state-enterprise 
reform, and ten large state-owned enterprises 
are set to sell stakes in their units. However, the 
pace of the reform has been slow, and concern 
over unrest by laid-off state workers has similarly 
stalled reforms of state-owned steel and coal 
enterprises (see Kevin Lin’s chapter in the Made 
in China Yearbook 2016). KL
(Sources: Bloomberg; Reuters; South China 
Morning Post; Xinhua News)
At the end of April, China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS) released its latest annual report 
on Chinese migrant workers. According to NBS, in 
2016 there were 281,710,000 migrants in China—1.5 
percent more than the previous year. Chinese workers 
appear to be increasingly reluctant to migrate far 
away from their hometowns. In 2016, 112,370,000 
workers migrated within the boundaries of their 
town (xiangzhen) of permanent residence—3.4 
percent more than the previous year—compared 
to 169,340,000 who moved away, an increase of 
barely 0.3 percent. Significantly, 88.2 percent of the 
new migrant workers did not leave their towns of 
permanent residence. Inter-provincial migration 
is also dropping: 76,660,000 workers migrated to 
another province in 2016, one percent less than the 
previous year. These trends are influenced both 
by the rapid development of the inner provinces, 
and the policies of the Chinese authorities that 
encourage migrants to start businesses in their 
hometowns. Other significant trends include: a) 
an increase in the percentage of female migrants, 
who constituted 35.5 percent of the total migrant 
workforce in 2016; b) the progressive aging of 
migrant workers, with the average age in 2016 being 
thirty-nine, 0.4 years older than the previous year; 
and c) an improvement in the educational level, 
with the percentage of migrant workers holding a 
high school diploma—seventeen percent—growing 
by 1.2 percent. Data related to the protection of 
labour rights are mixed. In 2016, migrants worked 
an average of 24.9 days a month and 8.5 hours a 
day, with 64.4 percent working more than eight 
hours a day, a decrease of 0.4 percent compared 
to the previous year. The contractualisation rate 
was 35.1 percent—1.1 percent less than the previous 
year. 2,369,000 migrant workers were owed back 
wages—a drop of 14.1 percent compared to 2015. 
In general, salaries were still on the rise. In 2016, 
migrant workers received an average of 3,275 yuan—
or 203 yuan more than the previous year—a growth 
rate of 6.6 percent. However, the growth rate for 
wages slowed by 0.6 percent. IF
(Sources: Caixin; National Bureau of Statistics; 
Sixth Tone) 
National Bureau of Statistics 
Releases Annual Report on 
Migrant Workers
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Fan Yusu Highlights Plight of 
Domestic Workers
Liu Xiaobo Released on 
Medical Parole with Late-
stage Cancer
In late April, Fan Yusu, a forty-four-year-old 
female migrant worker from Hubei province, 
was propelled to literary stardom when her essay 
entitled ‘I am Fan Yusu’ went viral. Fan’s essay 
recounts a life marked by patriarchy, domestic 
abuse, and raising children singlehandedly. She 
details her feelings of isolation, and the challenges 
she faced living as a domestic migrant worker in 
Beijing. Fan also reflects on her experiences of 
exploitation at the hands of employers, and the 
unequal treatment she has faced as a migrant due 
to government policies, stressing the need for 
solidarity between marginalised and exploited 
people in contemporary China. In the wake of 
her success, Fan has been offered book deals and 
media appearances, but has shunned the spotlight, 
reportedly leaving Beijing and going into hiding 
until the unwanted attention has subsided. NL
(Sources: China Digital Times; Los Angeles 
Review of Books; Sixth Tone; The Paper)
At the end of June, Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
Liu Xiaobo—who has been serving an eleven-
year jail sentence since 2009 for ‘inciting state 
subversion’—was released on medical parole to 
receive treatment for late-stage cancer. Liu was 
diagnosed on 23 May, and is now being treated 
in Liaoning province, despite the requests of his 
family for him to be treated outside China. Liu’s 
wife Liu Xia—an artist who has been under house 
arrest since 2010—has said that the cancer is 
inoperable and untreatable. Liu has been jailed a 
number of times since the early 1990s for various 
activities related to human rights and democracy. 
He was given his current prison sentence due to 
his involvement in the writing of Charter 08, a 
document calling for fundamental changes to the 
governance of China. NL
(Sources: BBC; Reuters; South China Morning 
Post; The Guardian; The New York Times)
Updates on Arrests of 
Lawyers and Activists
At the end of April, the ordeal of Li Heping, a 
prominent lawyer who was caught up in the ‘709 
crackdown’ against the weiquan community that 
took place in July 2015, came to an end. After 
being detained for almost two years, Li, who is 
well known to the international community for his 
overt rights activism, was convicted of ‘subversion 
of state power’. In a secret trial, a court in Tianjin 
sentenced him to three years in prison with a 
four-year reprieve, meaning that he was to be 
released but could still be arrested again at any 
time. The court ruled that since 2008, Li Heping 
repeatedly used the Internet and foreign media 
interviews to discredit and attack China’s state 
power and the legal system. The court also accused 
Li of accepting foreign funding and employing 
paid defendants. For many others the ordeal 
continues. The whereabouts of another lawyer, 
Wang Quanzhang, remain unknown. Alarming 
news has also emerged about weiquan lawyer Jiang 
Tianyong, who disappeared in November 2016 in 
connection with the Xie Yang’s case (see the brief 
in Made in China 1/2017): reports allege that he 
was tortured in detention. On 26 May, the Chinese 
authorities formally announced that Lee Ming-
cheh, the human rights advocate from Taiwan who 
had disappeared on arrival to Macau airport in 
March, was under arrest on a charge of ‘subverting 
state power’. Finally, on 23 June former migrant 
worker and blogger Lu Yuyu, who was detained 
in Yunnan province in June 2016 along with his 
partner Li Tingyu for his work of meticulously 
recording details of public protests online (see 
the brief in Made in China 2/2016), stood trial for 
‘picking quarrels and provoking troubles’. He faces 
three to five years in jail. Li Tingyu was tried in 
April and later released without a verdict. EN
(Sources: BBC; Hong Kong Free Press; The 
Guardian; The New York Times; The Wall Street 
Journal; Weibo)
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On 22 March, a Chinese construction worker 
died from a fall at the Imperial Pacific Casino 
construction site in the American Pacific island of 
Saipan. Soon after, Federal Bureau of Investigation 
agents raided the construction site and discovered 
hundreds of undocumented Chinese construction 
workers employed by a company named Suzhou 
Gold Mantis Construction and Decoration. They 
had been brought to Saipan illegally under a 
tourist visa programme, after being enticed by 
the false promises of the labour contractors. In 
April, United States prosecutors filed criminal 
charges against individuals connected to the 
Chinese labour contractors for illegally employing 
these workers, and the construction projects soon 
stalled. Investigators also discovered substandard 
working and living conditions. Out of job since 
early April, the undocumented workers fought for 
unpaid wages, staging public protests in front of 
the casino. On 16 May, over ninety unpaid workers 
received their salaries and placement fees, and 
flew back to China. On 1 June, another group of 
thirty-five Chinese workers staged a protest at 
the construction site to demand unpaid wages and 
reimbursement for medical fees for workplace 
injuries. Again on 22 June, forty-three unpaid 
workers protested at the same place against unpaid 
wages. After rejecting an offer of five thousand 
dollars each from the company, the protesting 
workers insisted that unless all workers are paid 
the full wages owed to them, they will not return to 
China. At the time of publishing, the issue remains 
unresolved. KL
(Sources: Saipan Tribune 1; Saipan Tribune 2; 
Saipan Tribune 3; The New York Times; The 
Paper)
Undocumented Chinese 
Workers Protest in Saipan
Labour Activists Detained 
While Investigating Ivanka 
Trump’s Manufacturer
In late May, Hua Haifeng, Su Heng, and Li Zhao—
three labour activists working for the New York-
based advocacy group China Labor Watch (CLW)—
were detained by the police in Ganzhou, Jiangxi 
province, while investigating labour conditions at 
factories making designer shoes for global brands. 
In particular, they were inspecting a supplier of 
Ivanka Trump’s fashion brand. Earlier in May, CLW 
had issued an interim report that alleged forced 
overtime and a monthly salary of two thousand 
and five hundred yuan in this factory. The three 
investigators have been charged on suspicion of 
illegal eavesdropping, and given limited access to 
lawyers. According to Li Qiang, the organisation’s 
Executive Director, CLW has been conducting 
investigations in China for seventeen years, but 
this is the first time that its investigators have 
been detained. Ivanka Trump’s brand has sought 
to distance itself from its Chinese supplier. On 5 
June, Alicia Edwards, a spokeswoman for the US 
State Department, declared that the American 
government is concerned by the arrests, and added 
that the investigations carried out by Chinese 
labour activists help American companies to 
understand conditions in their supply chains 
in order to hold manufacturers accountable. In 
response, on 6 June Hua Chunying, spokeswoman 
for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said 
that the activists were being investigated on 
suspicion of using illegal ‘professional surveillance 
equipment.’ She added that the case was being 
dealt with according to the law and that no foreign 
country had the authority to interfere in China’s 
judicial process. Relatives of the activists have 
reported being harassed by the public security. On 
27 June, the three investigators were released on 
bail pending trial. KL
(Sources: Associated Press; BBC; Bloomberg; 
The New York Times; The Paper)
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CHINA
COLUMNS
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Eighteen months after the Chinese 
crackdown on human rights lawyers started on 
9 July 2015 (the so-called ‘709 Crackdown’), a 
debate took place within the communities of 
China’s human rights lawyers (weiquan lüshi). 
It was a brief, yet passionate and provocative, 
discussion on some fundamental questions 
about the limits of the law in seeking justice 
and protecting rights in an authoritarian 
state, and on the limited role that lawyers can 
play in this endeavour. A pointed question 
that has been raised is whether the traditional 
case-focused and law-centred strategy of 
legal mobilisation, moderate or aggressive, 
is still a feasible approach to bring structural 
changes to the political system, incremental 
or otherwise. In the aftermath of the latest 
wave of repression, lawyers started to reflect 
on their past successes and failures, casting 
doubts on the potential of their own profession 
in catalysing political transformation. They 
also began to express deeply-seated anxiety, 
frustration, and confusion about human rights 
lawyering. Ultimately all the challenging 
questions boil down to this: is there a future 
for human rights lawyering in China as we 
know it? 
This essay addresses this question by 
analysing the practices of human rights 
lawyering, and by examining in broad strokes 
the process through which human rights 
discourses are translated into practices and 
the circumstances in which a socio-legal 
mobilisation may fail or succeed. In particular, 
the article focuses on the collective and 
sustained endeavours in which human rights 
lawyers and other citizen activists advocate 
the rights of specific communities through 
a relatively stable organisational structure. 
The primary concern here is not with the 
exceptional successes, nor with the notable 
failures in rights practices manifested in 
individual cases. Instead, the point is to take 
a close look at institutionalised routines in 
which legal cases are used as entry points to 
mobilise support from popular opinion, and 
bring those pressures to bear on decision-makers. 
Fu Hualing
In the aftermath of the latest wave of repression, 
Chinese human rights lawyers have started 
to reflect on their past successes and failures. 
They also began to express anxiety, frustration, 
and confusion about their work. Ultimately all 
the soul searching boils down to one question: 
is there a future for human rights lawyering in 
China as we know it? To answer this question, 
this essay analyses the practices of human rights 
lawyering, and examines the circumstances 
in which socio-legal mobilisation may fail or 
succeed.
What Future is there 
for Human Rights 
Lawyering in China?
12
Free the Rights Defense Lawyers, by 
Badiucao courtesy of China Digital Times
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Human Rights Ideas as an 
External Shock
To change a stagnant system, an external 
shock through the challenge of fresh and 
even ‘subversive’ ideas is necessary. Most 
of the human rights ideas, as practiced in 
China, originated outside of China and were 
then appropriated by Chinese reformers. 
Given that China is a late-comer in the 
construction of its legal system, importation 
and appropriation of foreign ideas has proved 
crucial for the seeding, incubation, and 
growth of rights discourses and practices. 
Since legal activism is guided by a moral 
vision of social change for the better, ideas 
that are appropriated are often regarded 
as progressive with some liberating and 
emancipatory impact. As such, they serve 
multiple functions. Ideas have an enlightening 
power: they educate, raise awareness, allow 
people to look at their world in alternative 
ways, and, in general, they lift up people’s 
spirit. Ideas also have the instrumental value 
of empowering people to re-frame their 
grievances and claims, enabling them to 
articulate and assert their positions in more 
effective and forceful ways. 
The appropriation of human rights 
discourses has always been a contentious 
issue. Some concepts have been quickly 
accepted and entered the mainstream. Others 
remain lofty ideas at a philosophic level, but 
have not been meaningfully put into practice. 
Yet others have been rejected firmly at an 
ideological level. In general, to become part 
of the mainstream, a rights discourse has to 
be politically acceptable or at least tolerated. 
In addition, we can say that if a discourse is 
merely property of the elites or vanguards, 
and the masses cannot claim ownership and 
make use of it in their daily life, it will not be 
effective. 
Legal activism is a top-down process in 
which elite members of a community—and 
those with visions, resources, and leadership 
ability—can, in the right circumstances, 
translate rights discourse into practices that 
will eventually catalyse a rights movement. 
China is not short of heroes or heroines in the 
legal field who have the courage and wisdom 
to fight alone. But what makes China’s rights 
practice enduring is the alliance making 
in the rights complex, capacity building in 
the NGO sectors, and the development of a 
critical citizenship among stakeholders and 
constituents.  
No Leaders, No Rights 
Movements
China’s rights movement is closely 
associated with a small group of individuals 
who often single-handedly trigger and then 
lead rights mobilisation in their respective 
fields. Few would deny the significant 
contributions that a limited number of 
individuals have made in organising and 
leading China’s rights practices. No leaders, 
no rights movements. 
Leaders in China’s rights movement share 
many core characteristics. A key quality of 
an effective rights leader is their credibility 
among the constituents they seek to 
represent. Leaders are not only embedded in 
the communities they work with, but are also 
able to develop common interests through 
their advocacy. An idea may be foreign, but 
organisation must be indigenous, and activism 
that is resilient and effective must be bottom 
up and inside out. In that sense, successful 
leaders are insiders. What is crucial, in the 
end, is the common identity, developed 
through frequent interpersonal connections, 
that binds leaders and constituents. Leaders 
who are embedded in, part of, and supported 
by the respective physical and cultural 
communities are able to make their ideas 
enter the mainstream, empower and energise 
communities, and translate their ideas into 
practice. A shared identity, such as that of 
13MADE IN CHINA - CHINA COLUMNS
gender, sex orientation, disability, or social 
status, generates a strong sense of internal 
solidarity which, in turn, motivates members 
to strive for a collective endeavour. 
There exist different strategies based on 
different positioning of the leaders and the 
demands of their constituents. There are also 
significant fault lines, which divide rights 
movements in various subfields. First of all, 
there is a divide based on agenda setting and 
prioritisation of issues between elitists who 
aim at policy change and political impact, and 
grassroots campaigners who are principally 
concerned with welfare and short-term 
interests. Second, there is a fault line 
between those who focus on individual cases 
and those who prioritise institutional and 
structural changes. The main question in this 
case is whether the limited resources should 
be spent on addressing some immediate 
concerns or on raising more structural 
issues targeting a root cause. Finally, there 
is differentiation between those who work 
for and within the system, and those who 
challenge it. Traditional human rights 
lawyering is suspicious of legal institutions, 
and treats courts as adversaries rather than 
partners to work with and rely on. However, 
many lawyers insistently rely on the system 
to achieve larger policy objectives. Instead 
of challenging or bypassing the courts, there 
is now a more critical engagement between 
judges and lawyers in the courtroom, as well 
as in the court of public opinion. 
For instance, the celebrated Mr Lu Jun, a 
key leader in China’s civil society, argues 
persistently and forcefully that organisation 
matters the most in socio-legal activism. 
By organisation, Lu means coordinated and 
sustained socio-legal mobilisation that is 
case-focused and rights-based. This requires 
the active participation of lawyers, NGOs, and 
media, aiming simultaneously at influencing 
the immediate legal decision, shaping public 
opinion, and lobbying institutions for certain 
legal and policy changes. Under Lu Jun’s 
leadership, the NGO Yirenping excelled in 
public interest advocacy, but this was prior to 
the tightening of space for legal mobilisation 
and, indeed, Lu himself has become a victim 
of the crackdown. Can this style of public 
interest lawyering continue in these new and 
visibly more hostile circumstances?   
Lingering Spaces for 
Socio-Legal Mobilisation
While the world’s attention is directed to 
the persecution of lawyers and activists in the 
wake of the 709 Crackdown, there remains 
in China a resilient form of socio-legal 
mobilisation with a sharp focus on equality 
rights. Yes, there is much less political space 
for activism and street action, but while 
this new hostile environment has halted 
the flash mob type of street action, a court-
centric mobilisation is still feasible. This is a 
familiar story in which human rights lawyers 
work closely with the respective NGOs and 
use litigation as an entry point to shape and 
influence public opinion with the ultimate 
goal of achieving certain legal or policy 
changes. 
A key difficulty in launching public interest 
litigation today is the absence of plaintiffs. 
Suffering and grievances abound, but victims 
who are willing to step up to confront their 
bullies are a rare occurrence. Once a plaintiff 
is identified and prepped, a campaign has 
to be designed and implemented. A suitable 
team of public interest lawyers is retained, 
law professors in the respective fields are 
consulted, and journalists are notified. Once a 
case is in court, the event is widely publicised 
and circulated in the media—including in 
official media—whose involvement may have 
been reduced but has not been prohibited. 
In these cases, all the parties in the rights 
arena have a common goal, that is to make the 
case educational for the general public and 
a deterrent for offending parties. The media 
landscape remains a significant battleground 
for public interest cases. Through a strategy 
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of combining legal action through social 
media mobilisation and civil society capacity 
building, underpinned by continuous legal 
reform to strengthen professionalism, 
lawyers are able to move forward—inch by 
inch—knowing the potential setbacks and 
risks that lie ahead.  
Without a meaningful political process, 
legal mobilisation that is case-focused and 
court-centric is bound to be ‘petty’—soft in the 
approaches taken, incremental in objectives 
to achieve, and negligible in challenges to 
pose. Ten years ago, lawyers went to court to 
challenge discriminatory rules and practices; 
now the same lawyers have to restart, 
literally from scratch, similar litigation. Now, 
however, they have less political space while 
continuing to experience a similar degree of 
ignorance, insensitivity, and hostility. Even 
if they win, as they occasionally do, their 
actions do little to moderate political power 
or to hold the repressive arm of the state 
accountable. 
Two Answers to the 
Challenges Ahead
Activist lawyers have offered two answers 
to the challenges. A ‘weak’ answer relies on 
remedial justice. That is, while well aware of 
the structural constraints placed on socio-
legal activism, lawyers can still choose to 
do whatever they are allowed to do in order 
to make a contribution. As long as there is 
space—no matter how limited this space is—
and as long as there are cases—no matter how 
petty they are—lawyers will continue.
A ‘strong’ answer points to the fact that 
public interest law survives a brutal political 
repression thanks to the resilience and 
strength of a rebellious sector in the legal 
profession and in civil society. Public interest 
litigation is not mainly about winning a case, 
but is about persuading power holders and 
educating the general public. Education and 
persuasion are necessarily slow paced and 
incremental in their processes. In addition, 
cases and the battles surrounding them serve 
as boosters for all stakeholders in the rights 
complex as, one by one, they strengthen 
the resolve of the forces of civil society and 
enhance their capacity in their on-going 
negotiations with the Party-state.  
More specifically and pointedly, individual 
cases do trigger systemic or structural 
changes. There are many examples of case-
driven changes that have happened in the 
past. While one can argue that legal advocacy 
in authoritarian states cannot lead to 
transformative political change—and that, as 
some human rights lawyers insist, legal battles 
in court rooms do not have a democratisation 
potential—one can argue with equal force 
that, as long as the regime embraces a degree 
of legality and promulgates laws to protect 
a range of legal rights, those rights-friendly 
laws can be enforced more or less effectively, 
and rights can be protected more or less 
rigorously. Legal and political opportunities 
are there, and it depends on civic leaders, 
professionals, and civil society at large to 
seize the opportunities to empower their 
human agency and to maximise their rights 
and freedoms through socio-legal action.      
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3,653 days, 3,653 posts. Day after day for ten 
years, one solitary blogger has been keep-
ing track of the time that has passed since 
28 March 2007, when fifteen-year-old Yuan 
Xueyu disappeared from a construction site 
in the centre of Zhengzhou, Henan province. 
Every morning, this blogger—who in his ‘or-
dinary’ life is a prominent media personali-
ty in China—posts exactly the same message: 
‘Today it is day x in the search of Yuan Xueyu. 
Public Security Bureau of Zhengzhou, could 
you please tell us what progress has been 
made in his case? The missing workers in the 
incident of the black brick kilns in Shanxi 
province remain missing. Netizens have do-
nated four thousand yuan as a reward for any 
relevant clue. The Public Security Bureau of 
Zhengzhou opened the case related to Yuan 
Xueyu’s disappearance back in 2007.’ 
Yuan Xueyu had arrived in Zhengzhou a 
couple of weeks before his disappearance to 
be an apprentice to a fellow villager—a work-
er specialising in setting up window frames. 
Like many of his childhood friends, he had 
been unable to resist the call of the big city, 
Ivan Franceschini
In the spring and summer of 2007, bands 
of aggrieved parents roamed the Chinese 
countryside looking for their missing children, 
whom they learned had been kidnapped and 
sold as slaves to illegal kilns. Thanks to the 
involvement of Chinese media and civil society, 
the so-called ‘black brick kilns incident’ became 
one of the most remarkable stories of popular 
mobilisation and resistance in contemporary 
China. Now that ten years have passed, are 
there any lessons that we can draw from this 
moment in history?
Slaving Away: The 
‘Black Brick Kilns 
Scandal’ Ten Years 
On
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which resounded particularly strong in his 
remote rural village, and against the wishes of 
his father had dropped out of middle school. 
When he heard that his son was nowhere to 
be found, Yuan Cheng did not waste any time. 
He immediately went to Zhengzhou and took 
up a job in the same construction site. He 
posted leaflets with the photo of his son ev-
erywhere, but the only result was that strang-
ers started to call him pretending to know the 
boy. Saying that his son had been in an acci-
dent, they asked him to wire some money and 
then disappeared. It was only after encoun-
tering other parents whose children had dis-
appeared in similar circumstances, that Yuan 
Cheng finally found some hope. Listening to 
their stories, he realised that there was a good 
chance that his son had been kidnapped and 
sold into slavery in a brick kiln somewhere in 
the countryside. The prospects were still dim, 
but at least now he had an idea where to look.
In the spring and summer of 2007—in what 
came to be known as the ‘black brick kilns 
incident’ (heizhuanyao shijian)—these bands 
of aggrieved parents roaming the Chinese 
countryside looking for their missing chil-
dren made for one of the most remarkable 
stories of popular mobilisation and resis-
tance in contemporary China. It was a saga 
of unendurable pain and unprecedented ca-
maraderie—of friendship as well as betrayal. 
It was a story that deserved to be told and it 
quickly piqued my interest and sparked my 
imagination. I wrote both my first book and 
one of my earliest media reports on the in-
cident. Instead of focusing on the dark side of 
slavery and exploitation, I decided to empha-
sise on the positive side of the mobilisation 
of Chinese civil society in support of these 
aggrieved parents. It was indeed an amazing 
display of solidarity, something that remains 
awe-inspiring even today. Now that ten years 
have passed, are there any lessons that we can 
still draw from this story?
A Mother’s Determination
The chain of events that led to the explo-
sion of interest in the kilns scandal began in 
March 2007 with Yang Aizhi, a mother whose 
sixteen-year old son had recently gone miss-
ing in Zhengzhou. After covering the city 
with posters, Yang was contacted by anoth-
er parent who told her that his two sons had 
just escaped from slavery in a kiln in Shanxi 
province. Convinced that her son had to be 
in a similar place, Yang immediately left for 
the area. There, she visited no less than one 
hundred kilns, finding many young slaves, 
some of them still wearing school uniforms. 
After going back to Henan, she got in touch 
with five other parents in the same situation 
through the missing people announcements 
published on the pages of a local newspaper. 
Together, they established what the Chinese 
media later termed the ‘League of the Search 
for Children’ (xunzi lianmeng). In just a cou-
ple of months they rescued more than forty 
children from slavery.
Realising that their task far outweighed 
their strength, they decided to seek help from 
the media. As it turned out, their stories were 
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so difficult to believe that only one journal-
ist, Fu Zhenzhong of the City Channel (dushi 
pindao), a local TV station in Henan, accepted 
to follow them in their search. He made the 
right choice. When, on the evening of 19 May 
2007, the footage of young boys wearing rags 
and doing heavy works in kilns in Shanxi that 
Fu had shot with a hidden camera was aired 
on television, there was an uproar. As Fu later 
recalled, ‘in the three days after the airing of 
the feature about the kilns, about one thou-
sand parents came to the TV station looking 
for help.’ On that day, mothers and fathers 
that until that moment had not known where 
to look for their children discovered the exis-
tence of the kilns and realised that they were 
not alone in their plight. It was then that 
these parents started organising themselves 
in small teams to scour the Shanxi country-
side. 
Then, on 6 June, the aunt of a child recently 
rescued by the League expressed her grati-
tude in a tearful post on a local web portal in 
Henan province. This post, which was shared 
by more than three hundred thousand people 
all over the country, finally managed to attract 
the attention of the national media. From that 
moment on, ‘black brick kilns’ became a term 
of common use throughout China.
The Hidden Rules of the 
Kilns
For the whole summer of 2007, the cover-
age of the scandal on the Chinese media was 
impressive, with journalists and media out-
lets competing with each other to describe 
the reality of the kilns in the smallest detail. 
Even the Party struggled to keep up with this 
avalanche of information. It came out that 
the slaves in the kilns were not only teenag-
ers who had been deceived with the illusion 
of a well-paid job or abducted with violence, 
but also adults with mental problems and 
children, a docile workforce that never raised 
any demands. Among the lesser-known sur-
vivor stories was that of Hao Dingpo, a fif-
teen-year-old boy who had spent two and a 
half years in the kilns after being kidnapped 
from Zhengzhou in March 2005. According to 
his mother, whom I interviewed back in May 
2008, when he finally managed to escape in 
the summer of 2007, he had waist-long hair 
and a number on his wrist. According to his 
testimony, names were never used in the kiln, 
only numbers. They had a daily production 
quota of ten thousands bricks and, when they 
were not able to fulfil it, they were savagely 
beaten. When a fugitive was caught attempt-
ing to escape, he was beaten to death by the 
guards and the body was left in the open to rot 
as a warning to others. Hao Dingpo claimed to 
have seen six people dying this way, but there 
was no way to verify his claim as he was never 
able to indicate the exact location of the kiln.
The conditions in the kilns had a dramatic 
impact not only on the body of the slaves, but 
also on their mental well-being. When I met 
Zhang Shanlin in May 2008, one year after 
the police had rescued his son from a kiln, he 
was worried because the boy, who once had 
been lively and cheerful, had lost any interest 
in anything, including in his dream of becom-
ing a chef. The teenager refused to leave his 
house and avoided any human contact. He not 
only felt ashamed about what had happened 
to him, but he also kept dreaming about his 
life in the kiln and woke up screaming almost 
every night.
The media were relentless in eviscerating 
the local dynamics behind the existence of 
the kilns. It was evident that the regime of the 
kilns could exist only because many people 
benefitted from it. A Nanfang Zhoumo report 
quoted a former slave as saying: ‘[The life in 
the kiln] was like the food chain in the animal 
realm… This chain had six rings: the owner of 
the kiln > the baogongtou [i.e. a subcontractor 
in charge of all matters related to the work-
ers] > the guards > the older workers > the 
new workers > the retards.’ While the own-
er was always a local person, the baogongtou 
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generally came from somewhere else—usual-
ly the place where he found his victims. 
The relationship between the black kilns 
and the local communities was also very im-
portant. Although many accounts described 
the geographical seclusion of these places, 
local people were well aware of these reali-
ties. The reason they accepted them is that 
the economy of the kilns had its advantages 
for the local community, since they stimu-
lated local development and created new op-
portunities to get rich. Support from the local 
community was also one of the reasons why 
escaping from the kilns was so hard. Since 
local workers were too expensive and almost 
impossible to exploit due to the protection 
coming from their familial networks, slaves 
were inevitably ‘outsiders’ (waidiren). Some-
times local people themselves contributed by 
supplying the kilns with the workforce they 
needed. This is what happened to Shen Hai-
jun, a thirty-eight-year-old man from Jiangsu 
province, who ended up as a slave in a kiln 
while looking for his mother, a sixty-year-old 
widow who had been sold as a wife to an old 
bachelor in Shanxi by a relative. Shen told 
the journalists that, once he had arrived in 
the village where his mother had been sold, 
he had asked an old lady for directions. Under 
the pretence of helping him find a well-paid 
job, she sold him to the local kiln owner. 
The higher echelons of the Party-state did 
not fare any better in the media. Reports not 
only highlighted that the middle-level bu-
reaucracy in Shanxi province was fully aware 
of the existence of the kilns, but that some 
officials were even complicit in perpetuating 
slavery. One of the most unbelievable stories 
of all was that of Zhu Guanghui, a young boy 
from Henan. Rescued by the police from a kiln 
on 27 April 2007, he was immediately sold 
back to another kiln by a local labour inspec-
tor, who even deducted an ‘intermediation 
fee’ (zhongjiefei) of three hundred yuan from 
the back salary of the boy. Zhu was rescued 
again during another police operation at the 
end of May. In the following days, a local TV 
station managed to record a confrontation be-
tween him and the labour inspector who had 
sold him. Nobody could have imagined that 
on that same afternoon the labour inspector 
would deceive the boy once again, selling him 
to yet another kiln. Finally, on 18 June 2007, 
Zhu Guanghui was rescued for a third time 
and managed to get back home safely. 
The Response of the 
Authorities
The stories told by families of the missing 
children were filled with desperation and 
highlighted the indifference of the local au-
thorities. Back in May 2008, Wang Xiaoli, 
the mother of a boy who had gone missing in 
2006 in Gongyi county, Henan province, told 
me: ‘When I went to the police to report that 
my son was missing, they declined to even 
open the case. They said that such situations 
are too common to be taken into consider-
ation.’ At the moment of his disappearance, 
her seventeen-year-old son was studying for 
the university admissions exam (gaokao). He 
was one of the best students in his school and 
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had a very good chance to be accepted to a 
top university—a remarkable achievement for 
a boy from a poor rural area. Yet, on 26 Oc-
tober 2006, he went missing without a trace: 
he was supposed to spend a few days at a 
friend’s house, but somehow disappeared be-
fore reaching his destination.
The media storm triggered by the aggrieved 
parents changed everything, at least for a few 
weeks. In June 2007, the central authorities 
reacted launching a provincial investigation 
into the Shanxi kilns. The numbers involved 
were impressive, the outcome less so. 
According to official data, the police checked 
86,395 employers, discovering that 36,286 
(forty-two percent) of them were operating 
without any formal permission; 4,861 brick 
and tile kilns were inspected, among which 
3,186 (63.3 percent) were found to be lacking 
any registration; in total, the workers in the 
kilns numbered eighty-one thousand, but 
only seventeen kilns were found to have 
severe problems. Among them, thirteen had 
incidents of child labour. On the whole, 359 
workers were rescued, including 121 mentally 
disabled adults and fifteen children.  In the 
meantime, the top echelons of the Party 
launched a campaign to ‘sweep’ the ranks 
of the local bureaucracy, with ninety-five 
officials being punished for malfeasance and 
dereliction of duty, while President Hu Jintao 
and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao raised their 
voices asking for further investigations to 
reveal cases of corruption related to the kilns. 
At the same time, the Chinese leadership 
could not miss the opportunity to ride the 
publicity wave of the scandal to promote its 
political agenda. In particular, the media 
coverage of the kilns was used to accelerate 
the troubled legislative process that led 
to the passage of the Labour Contract Law, 
then stranded due to the emergence of a 
heated public debate about the advisability 
of introducing new guarantees for workers’ 
rights at a stage in which economic 
development was still fuelled by low labour 
costs. After more than three years of top-
level discussions and more than a dozen 
blueprints, the kilns scandal was an essential 
factor that facilitated the ultimate approval 
of the Law, which was passed at the end of 
June right in the middle of the media storm. 
Xie Liangming, then Deputy Director of the 
Department of Legal Affairs of the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions, declared: ‘[If the 
kilns scandal had not happened] I think that 
the debate would have continued. Since the 
scandal deeply moved the legislative bodies, 
including many committee members who felt 
that such situations could not be understood 
and that it was necessary to be more severe, 
the Law was pushed through.’ 
The Kilns After the Kilns
Ten years later, the kilns might not be as 
widespread as before, but all the signs point 
to their continued existence. In May 2009, 
Chinese media reported that in Jieshou city, 
Anhui province, the police rescued thirty-
two mentally disabled workers enslaved in 
two different kilns. According to the available 
accounts, these people were deceived by a 
human trafficker, in this case a taxi driver, 
who earned two to three hundred yuan for 
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every person that he ‘introduced’ to the kilns. 
Closely guarded by thugs who did not hesitate 
to resort to violence, these slaves, whose age 
varied from twenty-five to forty-five, lived 
locked in a courtyard and were forced to 
work ten hours a day without receiving any 
wage besides a few yuan for their personal 
expenses. The police then arrested ten people, 
including the baogongtou and the owners.
In June 2010, Chinese media reported that 
the police in Shilin county, Yunnan province, 
had rescued about twenty slaves from a 
local kiln. One of the slaves, a man from 
Chongqing, described to the journalists the 
brutality of his guards who, in order to make 
him work seventeen hours a day, beat him 
with steel bars and leather belts. Similarly, in 
December 2010, a story of human trafficking 
of  individuals with disabilities based in 
Qu county, Sichuan province, was widely 
reported in the Chinese media. In that case, 
everything was happening with the open 
connivance of the local authorities, under the 
cover of a public shelter for disabled people. In 
another remarkable story, in September 2011 
Cui Songwang, a reporter for a Zhengzhou 
television station, hung around a train station 
posing as a disabled man for two days, until 
he was kidnapped and sold to a kiln manager 
for five hundred yuan. Cui said he was forced 
to work for three hours, beaten and deprived 
of water before he managed to escape and 
report the case to police. More recent media 
reports tell the story of slaves who managed 
to escape from the kilns, such as forty-three-
year old Xu Shuhe, who was a slave in black 
brick kilns in Guangzhou for twenty-four 
years; thirty-three-year old Fan Debao, who 
spent eleven years in slavery; and thirty-five-
year old Qi Zhaojun, who was deprived of his 
liberty for twenty-one years in a number of 
kilns in Shanxi province. 
Yuan Xueyu is still missing, another victim 
of what Børge Bakken has called China’s 
‘uncivil society’. His father Yuan Cheng is 
still looking for him and in his search has, thus 
far, been able to save more than one hundred 
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children. In all this, is there any lesson that 
can be drawn from what happened ten years 
ago? Looking at the latest developments 
in Xi Jinping’s China—the taming of the 
critical voices in traditional and new media, 
the arrests and disappearances of those who 
speak for the weak and disenfranchised, 
the systematic intimidation of those who 
challenge the message of ‘harmony’ espoused 
by the Chinese Communist Party—one cannot 
but wonder whether a display of solidarity 
like the one that took place during that hot 
summer of ten years ago would still be possible 
today. However, the solitary blogger’s daily 
post is a reminder that not everything is lost, 
that not everybody has forgotten. In the end, 
as they say, no matter how hard you try, paper 
cannot wrap up embers.
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Twenty years after the Chinese authorities 
decided to radically reform the country’s state 
industry, where does public memory of the 
nation’s socialist industrialisation reside? 
What aspects of the socialist path to modernity 
do officials or private citizens monumentalise, 
if any at all? To what extent does China’s 
contemporary heritage movement encompass 
its socialist industrial history? This essay offers 
an initial attempt to answer such questions.
China’s Industrial 
Heritage without 
History
In the late 1990s, thousands of factories 
across the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
closed down. Most had been created as part 
of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
programme to industrialise the nation after 
1949. Tens of millions of workers lost their 
jobs, and idle plants pockmarked thirty 
percent of the urban core of most cities. 
In Jingdezhen, the city that I have been 
studying since 2003, state and collective 
sector workers constituted ninety-four 
percent of the total employed population 
when these ‘structural reforms’ began, 
and the city contained approximately two 
hundred state and collective enterprises. The 
closures and mass layoffs profoundly shocked 
local residents, who experienced the ‘death’ 
of the city’s porcelain factories as happening 
‘almost overnight’. 
When China’s Communist leadership 
decided to privatise the state and collective 
sector, the nation took a final step away 
from its socialist path to modernity. From 
the 1950s through to the early 1990s, the 
central government invested massive sums in 
industrial development—building new plants, 
inventing and purchasing new technologies, 
expanding the workforce, and manufacturing 
new products. In Jingdezhen, ceramics 
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manufacturing grew from one thousand 
workers doing handicraft production in eight 
operating wood-burning kilns in 1948, into a 
massive porcelain industry employing over 
one hundred and fifty thousand workers 
in fifty-two mechanised sites, covering all 
aspects of the production process from 
mining to finished wares. While some outside 
observers and Chinese citizens recall this 
period primarily in terms of its political 
campaigns, the central government’s policies 
nevertheless shrank income disparities 
between the countryside and city, provided 
high levels of employment and extensive 
job and social security, increased women’s 
participation in the paid workforce, and raised 
educational levels. The decision to allow the 
market to drive industrial development was 
also a decision to relinquish most of the goals 
that characterised a socialist vision of the 
future. 
Twenty years after the PRC committed 
China’s industrial sector to the path 
of neoliberal capitalism, where does 
public memory of the nation’s socialist 
industrialisation reside? What aspects of the 
socialist path to modernity do officials or 
private citizens monumentalise, if any at all? 
To what extent does China’s contemporary 
heritage movement encompass its socialist 
industrial history? I offer here a first 
attempt to answer such questions, drawing 
on published sources and my fieldwork in 
Jingdezhen.
Preserving Memories of 
Socialist Industrialisation
Laid-off workers’ narratives are the richest 
repository of public memory about socialist 
industrialisation. Former state and collective 
workers have repeated their stories to 
journalists, documentary filmmakers, and 
scholars—not only at the time that the state 
and collective sector collapsed, but for more 
than a decade afterwards. In their accounts, 
laid-off workers testify to the meaningfulness 
of their membership in the socialist work unit 
(danwei) system in material and psychological 
terms. They reveal their sense of betrayal and 
injustice that ‘the promises of the socialist 
ideal simply vanished.’ Numerous testimonies 
show former state and collective employees’ 
insistent identification of themselves as ‘laid-
off workers’ (xiagang gongren), even when 
they have found other work. By retaining 
this label, these citizens make a claim to 
the socialist path of modernity despite the 
government’s rejection of it. 
A more superficial form of socialist 
industrial history resides in the former state 
and collective enterprise buildings that have 
been preserved and adapted for new purposes. 
This type of architectural preservation can be 
said to have begun in the mid- to late 1990s, 
when artists in Beijing and Shanghai rented 
abandoned factories and warehouses to use 
as studios. In Beijing, some artists who had 
been evicted from the area around the old 
Summer Palace in 1995 moved to Dashanzi, 
a state enterprise built in the 1950s that was 
once Asia’s largest military electronics plant. 
Factory 798 became particularly well known 
as an artists’ community, so much so that 
international art galleries and fashionable 
boutiques turned the site into an ‘art theme 
park’ by the mid-2000s. In 2006, the State 
Administration of Cultural Heritage of 
China published its first official documents 
promoting the preservation and reuse of 
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industrial heritage. After this, Beijing’s 
municipal authorities began offering funding 
for private developers. 
In Shanghai, private efforts to adapt 
socialist architecture received government 
support earlier than in Beijing, partly because 
the city had already begun preserving 
its semi-colonial industrial heritage 
in the early 1990s. One significant early 
development of a former socialist enterprise 
was the Chunming Roving Factory on Suzhou 
Creek. The Shanghai municipal government 
began redevelopment efforts here in 1992, 
spurred in part by water pollution. In 1997, 
Taiwanese architect Teng Kun Yen rented 
or purchased a Suzhou Creek warehouse 
built in the 1930s and made it into a design 
studio. His redevelopment sparked other 
artists and designers to undertake similar 
renovations, leading to the preservation and 
adaptive reuse of not only the Chunming 
Roving Factory but also the socialist factories 
on Taikang Road that became known as 
Tianzifang. Shanghai municipal government 
officials quickly recognised the potential 
of rehabilitated socialist architecture to 
enhance city branding and generate revenue. 
In 2004, they established a policy to promote 
‘creative industry clusters’ which included 
tax concessions, special funding, and the 
ability to redevelop industrial land without 
applying for formal re-designation. As a 
result, dozens of socialist industrial sites were 
repurposed as creative industry clusters.
A Bulldozer Approach
Other cities were less inclined to abandon 
what Yung, Chan, and Xu call the ‘bulldozer 
approach’ to urban planning. In a 2016 study 
of twenty cities that received significant 
state investment for industrialisation during 
the 1950s and 1960s, Yang shows that most 
municipal governments have not seen 
industrial heritage as a marketable resource 
for redevelopment and have instead removed 
remnants of China’s socialist past. In 
Jingdezhen, the bulldozer approach to urban 
planning began in 2000, when the Bureau of 
Industry and Commerce bought the Jingxing 
Porcelain Factory, demolished it, and turned 
the area into a fruit and vegetable market. 
Other sites of socialist industry were torn 
down and replaced with retail storefronts and 
apartments.
The former ‘large collective’ (dajiti) 
Sculpture Factory is Jingdezhen’s primary 
example of adaptive reuse from the socialist 
period. While portions of today’s Sculpture 
Factory bear no resemblance to the enterprise 
that was built in 1956, other parts have been 
preserved and adapted to serve the visiting 
artists and designers who participate in 
residencies at Carolyn Cheng’s Pottery 
Workshop. Cheng established her Jingdezhen 
branch of the Pottery Workshop in the 
Sculpture Factory in 2005. The facility now 
houses gallery space, an education centre, a 
café, and a shop, in addition to spaces where 
visiting artists can design and create ceramic 
works. 
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The former state-owned People’s Porcelain 
Factory, 2010.  
Photo: Diana Tung
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Mine Parks
Mine parks are a third type of site that 
holds memories of socialist industrialisation. 
In 2009, the China Mining Task Force 
announced the government’s decision to 
establish national mine parks at the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation Meeting. Seven 
years later, officials reported that China had 
created seventy-two national mine parks. 
Among them were the Jinhuagong Coal Mine 
Park in northern Shanxi, the Huangshi Coal 
Mine Park in Hubei, the Wanshan Mercury 
Mine Park in Guizhou, and the Haizhou 
Coal Mine in Liaoning. While some of the 
mines were put to use prior to the founding 
of the PRC, all received significant state 
resources and saw major resource extraction 
through to the end of the twentieth century. 
These ‘parks’ can include mine shafts, heavy 
machinery, historic photographs, socialist 
and contemporary art, and exhibits that 
describe the history of resource extraction 
and the ‘lifestyles of mining communities’. 
Researchers have just begun to investigate 
these new industrial heritage sites, with 
published masters theses from urban planning 
and architecture programmes. A glimpse of 
how China’s mine parks communicate the 
socialist vision of modernity is available 
from the reviews of visitors on Trip Advisor. 
Many describe the former mines as visually 
spectacular and educational. For some, 
the sites produce powerful experiences of 
identification with the former mine workers, 
a visceral sense of the forward pace of socialist 
modernisation (jianzhengle xiandai gongye 
fazhang qianjinde jiaobu), and an awareness 
of the economic decline suffered by cities 
dependent on extractible resources (ganjue 
zhege difang gen henduo ziyuankujie chengshi 
yiyang, you muoluo de ganjue).
A Façade of Socialist 
Modernity
China’s socialist industrial heritage is 
underdeveloped relative to its imperial 
and colonial pasts. Potential economic 
gains from tourism and commerce have 
driven the efforts made to date, which are 
almost exclusively focused on the built 
environment. For example, only two percent 
of China’s cultural relics relate to industry. 
Since at least some of these eighty-three 
artefacts are from industry prior to 1949, 
the officially-recognised cultural relics of 
socialist industrialisation represent an even 
smaller percentage of the total. At present, 
China’s restored socialist structures and their 
creative class inhabitants preserve merely the 
façade of socialist modernity. Today’s trendy 
new users largely overshadow the history of 
these sites’ industrial development and their 
rapid decline. The PRC has not yet created a 
national inventory of its socialist industrial 
heritage. Nor have authorities announced 
plans to collect oral histories of socialist 
modernisation. If such trends continue, what 
remains of the path that China travelled toward 
socialist modernity will vanish, leaving only a 
thin veneer of industrial heritage without its 
rich and colourful history.
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Introducing the 
Chinese Commons
‘[China’s] environment can no longer 
keep pace. Acid rain is falling on one third 
of China’s territory, half of the water in our 
seven largest rivers is completely useless, 
while one fourth of our citizens do not have 
access to clean drinking water. One third of 
the urban population is breathing polluted 
air, and less than twenty percent of the 
rubbish in cities is treated and processed 
in an environmentally sustainable manner. 
Finally, five of the ten most polluted cities 
worldwide are in China.’ This is an interview 
that Pan Yue—a former vice-minister of 
the Chinese Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (huanjing baohubu)—gave in 2005. 
During his time in office, Pan Yue introduced 
many radical ideas about possible solutions 
for China’s environmental issues, including 
a proposal for more democratic control over 
environmental policy-making. Interestingly, 
the Chinese authorities have now embraced 
some of Pan’s ideas as part of a national policy 
effort that goes under the name of ‘Ecological 
Civilisation’ (shengtai wenming). Ecological 
Civilisation stems from the recognition 
that any possibility for the reversal of the 
country’s ecological decline must come from 
an overall rethinking of its development 
strategies. Practically, the Central Committee 
of the Chinese Communist Party has, thus far, 
supported the establishment of an ecological 
compensation mechanism, supplementing 
GDP measurements with quality indicators 
that take into account environmental issues.
Pundits and government spokespersons 
are telling environmentalists worldwide to 
rejoice for what has been hailed as a veritable 
change of paradigm in China’s model of 
economic growth, from the plundering of 
natural resources to the rejuvenation of the 
country’s environment. And yet, despite the 
growing number of official statements and 
guidelines released by the Central Committee 
since 2013, there are those who fear that 
such suggestions will not go far enough 
in addressing the global magnitude and 
consequences of China’s ecological decline.
If anything, the situation in China has 
gotten even worse since Pan’s interview. 
According to the available data, almost 
twenty percent of China’s agricultural land 
is now contaminated, while sixty percent 
of China’s underground water supplies 
are said to be polluted. Drinking water in 
most of the country’s rural areas is unfit for 
human consumption because of pollution 
from fertilisers, pesticides, and industrial 
activity. Meanwhile worsening air quality 
has resulted in China taking the top spot in 
the world rankings for deadliest outdoor 
air pollution. Crucially, many of China’s 
current environmental issues seem to 
originate from the state’s apparent inability 
to manage, on its own terms, the manifold 
dimensions of the country’s ecological crisis. 
Desertification is expanding on an average of 
one thousand and five hundred square miles 
per year, in part because of ill-conceived and 
counterproductive governmental attempts at 
stopping soil erosion through reforestation. 
Sustainable grassland management in Tibet 
deteriorates as China implements energy 
substitution policies intended to alleviate 
the country’s dependence on coal. Finally, 
while the industry of waste processing is now 
making a substantial contribution to China’s 
‘green growth’, it is the country’s poorest, and 
those across its borders, who bear the burden 
of the industry’s pollution.
How should we interpret the current crisis? 
How are Chinese citizens meant to organise 
themselves so that they might preserve 
and restore the environment they rely on 
and commonly share? This issue of Made 
in China deals with the rupture between 
unilaterally advocated projects for national 
and environmental renewal, and those 
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popular voices, practices, and ideas which 
are usually left unregistered at the margins 
of the environmental debate. We look into 
the contemporary shapes and dynamics of 
Chinese citizens’ engagements with the 
rejuvenation of their environment, and 
interrogate their potential for articulating 
workable alternatives. We give a name to our 
collective ethnographic intrusions into this 
topic: the ‘commons’. While this is a word 
that has recently received a lot of attention—
especially thanks to the work of Elinor 
Ostrom—here we wish to extend its meaning. 
Ostrom has been rightly awarded a Nobel Prize 
for empirically demonstrating that ordinary 
people have the capacity to sustainably 
manage the environment without state 
supervision or the creation of market forces. 
They do so by managing the environment in 
common, that is by equipping themselves 
with collegially crafted rules that enable 
them to modulate their competing needs with 
a view to fostering their community’s long-
term flourishing and accommodating the 
fluctuating availability of natural resources. 
We build on Ostrom’s formulation, but 
we are wary of the ways in which her work 
has recently been co-opted by several 
international institutions and government 
agencies dancing to the tune of neoliberal 
politics. Since Garrett Hardin’s Tragedy of 
the Commons, the concept of the commons 
has, in fact, served as a Trojan horse to 
smuggle a host of technocratic instruments 
into environmental politics. Instruments 
contrary to what the notion of the commons 
was originally meant to achieve: wealth 
concentration. Institutionalising the idea 
of the commons has meant the rekindling 
of top-down political proposals to achieve 
environmental sustainability that is 
also growth compatible through more—
and allegedly better designed—market 
mechanisms and incentives. With this issue 
we wish to reclaim the term, the commons, in 
order to serve a different agenda. 
To achieve this, we expand Ostrom 
definitions of rules and the environment. 
With ‘environment’ we don’t simply refer to 
a collection of disposable matter, but to the 
assemblage of infrastructure, institutions, and 
life forms—the mutual relationships of which 
we humans have progressively reimagined 
and folded back into nature to pursue the best 
interest of our species. Stretching the meaning 
of the word ‘environment’ this way allows 
us to scrap the untenable nature/culture 
dichotomy underpinning Ostrom’s approach, 
thus precluding the idea that sustainability 
can be achieved without the corresponding 
changes in our capitalist order. The idea 
of rules is subjected to a similar process of 
re-theorisation. Rules, and the codification 
of behaviour they entail, are only rarely the 
way Ostrom sees them: the product of an 
effort ‘to achieve order and predictability’ in 
a community of resource users. Rather, our 
case studies will show how processes of rule 
creation lead to alternative methods of action 
that may actually subvert the established 
order of resource extraction and consumption, 
fighting against the predictability of incessant 
capitalist expansion and commoditisation of 
nature.
What do we gain from looking for this 
expanded commons in China? What types 
of aspirations, creativity, and commitments 
do the commons give rise to in this country? 
Our ethnographic explorations of the Chinese 
commons will look into existing projects that 
seek to make the environment a common 
resource. We investigate the latent potential 
of everyday forms of resistance, refusal, 
and dissent for redrawing the frontiers of 
resource commodification in the increasingly 
degrading ecology of contemporary China.
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The debate over China’s environmental issues 
has given scant consideration to already 
existing popular alternatives to the top-
down, growth-compatible governance of 
the country’s natural resources. Forty years 
of Party-sanctified insistence on pursuing 
relentless economic development has seemingly 
suppressed alternative discourses in natural 
resource management. However, if we take 
closer look, we will find that at the grassroots 
there is no lack of alternatives. For instance, 
in contemporary rural China there are places 
where water is being managed as a commons.
A Water Commons 
in China?
As a one-time campaigner for the 2011 
Italian Referendum against the privatisation 
of the country’s domestic water services, 
I was excited to discover during fieldwork 
in Yunnan province that when briefed and 
asked about their views on the referendum 
proposals, most of my informants in the 
water sector were in fact sympathetic to 
them. They similarly hoped to protect water 
from marketisation and demanded the 
democratisation of its management. 
As I write this essay, an ethnographic scene 
comes to mind. One day in 2012, I took part in 
negotiations between a Village Committee and 
a public-private enterprise regarding a water 
conservancy project that would have required 
the relocation of several of the village’s 
households. The Committee pointed out that 
the proposed project mainly benefited the 
enterprise, which would gain access to state 
subsidies regardless of the efficacy of their 
infrastructure. The enterprise was legally 
required to win the Committee’s assent to the 
project. To do so, they eventually had to accede 
to the local Party Secretary’s request that the 
enterprise build a number of free-of-charge 
water dispensers for the newly relocated 
households at its own expense. Cases of 
political strong-arming for the sake of public 
access to water such as this had also been 
typical of Italian campaigners in the run-
up to the referendum. But such similarities 
begs the question: if Chinese people involved 
in everyday water politics were thinking 
along similar lines to Italian water activists, 
what was pre-empting the emergence of a 
similar movement in China? Obviously, the 
two countries are characterised by divergent 
political traditions and conceptions of social 
and environmental justice—for instance, 
a referendum is a not an option in China. 
However, in this essay I will explore whether 
the answer may have something to do with 
the thus far poorly theorised question of the 
Commons in China.
In what follows I will argue that in 
contemporary rural China there are places 
A water delivery initiative in northwest Yunnan. 
Famers receive barrels of drinking water from 
the government while fresh water from local 
springs is impounded and diverted elsewhere.
Photo: Andrea E. Pia
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where water is already being managed as a 
commons. Making fresh water a commonly 
held resource entails breaking with global 
practices of water management in three 
ways. First, water has to lose its status as a 
commodity and be re-defined as a flowing 
component of the environment. When water 
is reconceptualised as a commons, the 
continuous local availability of its nurturing 
flow gains prominence over the market-
mediated relationship between its supply 
and demand. Here, the notion of a nurturing 
flow illuminates the broadly defined life-
supporting functions exerted by water within 
both human and non-human ecosystems. 
Second, from the point of view of its 
management, water services cease to be run 
for profit, return on capital invested in water 
infrastructure lowers to zero, and ownership 
is reframed as a shared obligation to 
universal and sustainable provision. Finally, 
water services are opened up to public and 
associative participation into the crafting, 
enforcement, and monitoring of relevant rules 
with a view to preserving the life-nurturing 
qualities of the water flow over generations, 
as well as for non-human ecosystems. 
The Appeal of Techno-
Political Frameworks
So far the debate about China’s current 
environmental issues has given little 
consideration to already existing popular 
alternatives to the top-down, growth-
compatible governance of the country’s 
endangered natural resources. Forty years 
of Party-sanctified insistence on pursuing 
relentless economic development has 
seemingly muffled the few dissenting voices 
and suppressed alternative discourses in 
natural resource management—such as 
those concerned with stewardship, care, 
maintenance, or even rejuvenation of the 
Chinese environment. 
Instead, the language of techno-politics is 
holding sway. This is a mix of legal tweaks and 
engineering innovations—for instance, those 
behind the introduction of tradable water 
permits and huge water diversion schemes—
which, by preaching the appealing fantasy of 
the harmonious coexistence of China’s present 
capitalist mode of development with nature, 
have slowly won over many of China’s most 
belligerent environmentalists. Surprisingly, 
the case for the coexistence of continuous 
growth and sustainability has arguably 
found a favourable, if unlikely, currency for 
its propagation in the political doctrine of 
‘Ecological Civilisation’ (shengtai wenming). 
While proposing a re-orientation of China’s 
current model of growth (hailed by a felicitous 
start and some early success stories), in the 
sanitised version currently peddled by the 
Chinese government, Ecological Civilisation 
actually seems to be working to reinforce a 
chauvinistic and system-preserving distrust in 
local people’s ability to redress the imbalance 
between efficiency in resource use and equity 
in allocation. What gets de-emphasised 
in the institutionalisation of Ecological 
Civilisation is the potential offered by 
empowering communities to democratically 
take environmentally sensitive decisions 
for themselves. Redressing this imbalance 
appears to me as a valuable short-term goal if 
at least to avoid some of the most obnoxious 
unintended consequences of techno-politics.
A Problem of ‘Distribution 
of the Sensible’
The dominance of the top-heavy techno-
politics of sustainability in China renders 
local people incapable of articulating and 
implementing alternatives. That does not 
mean to say that local people have no interest 
in developing alternative ways of dealing 
with environmental crises. Indeed, a good 
deal of empirical work has recently suggested 
that concrete local alternatives to business-
as-usual are, if anything, in very high-
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demand, especially for those at the periphery 
of contemporary Chinese society. Citizens at 
the losing end of economic development—
including rural resettlers, ethnic minorities, 
and others—are all aware that environmental 
degradation is impacting them first. For 
instance, those who have to figure out how to 
fetch their clean water everyday usually seek 
out workable alternatives more pressingly 
than environmentally-blind urbanites. The 
analytical problem is, therefore, one of 
recognising the political agency of those who 
are elaborating viable counter-practices.
While the people directly engaged with 
the governance of natural resources may 
themselves ignore the extent to which 
the alternatives they put to work can be 
identified as sustainable or even counter-
paradigmatic within China’s institutional 
architecture, the problem at stake here is 
one of visibility—or as Rancière would put 
it, one of the ‘distribution of the sensible’. 
Rancière suggests that political fault lines are 
perceivable only to the groups who are sitting 
by them—in our case disenfranchised farmers 
living in water dispossessed communities—
while their capacity to effectively overcome 
common predicaments in any political 
consequential way is publicly denied to 
them by their very proximity to such fault 
lines. Thus, counter-practices and counter-
enunciation are rendered unintelligible to 
anyone, their supporters included.
Public recognition does not just make 
alternative political practices widely 
known, but also efficacious. Up until now, 
the multifarious sustainability proposals 
championed by the Chinese government have 
taken the lion’s share of the public debate on 
sustainability in the country, so much so that 
the very people who are concretely engaging 
with political practices of responsible, 
equitable, and un-marketed stewardship of 
common resources in contemporary China 
are not able to call them for what they are. 
Even worse, they struggle to see them as 
being in discontinuity from the demonstrably 
short-term solutions ushered in by those 
who consider the environmental question a 
technical problem requiring nothing more 
than the tools available within the imaginative 
horizon of capitalism. 
Canal Managers of 
Erstwhile
Between 2011 and 2013, I spent eighteen 
months working with water bureaucrats and 
farmers as they went about implementing 
changes in the provision of irrigation and 
drinking water in their county. During this 
time, the price of drinking water doubled and 
the two local water agencies in charge of tax 
collection, infrastructure upkeep, and water 
development were transferred to hard budget 
accounts. Meanwhile, state and private funds 
were being diverted towards nearby cities. 
Farmers were also asked to reinvent themselves 
as members of Water Users’ Associations 
(WUAs), alien organisations handed down to 
villagers by Mandarin-speaking university-
trained officials aimed at making the service 
more responsive to local needs and, most 
importantly, cheaper. Farmers were suddenly 
told to become familiar with the new norms 
that regulated the use, control, and exchange 
rights over water. They were warned that the 
government would hold them responsible 
for mismanaging the service they were now 
instructed to provide. During inaugural WUA 
meetings, the language of techno-politics was 
extensively used. While most of what was said 
would make direct reference to the science of 
the Commons, the farmers understood that 
they would now have to work for free as canal 
managers (guanzhang).
Prior to the advent of WUAs, being a canal 
manager had, in fact, been something everyone 
in this part of Yunnan was quite familiar with. 
It was a democratic and collectively financed 
position to which farmers were appointed on 
a rotating basis, according to a broader system 
of rules on local water management. Farmers 
appointed canal managers on every single 
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portion of a canal adjoining a field or a house. 
They entrusted neighbouring members of this 
infrastructural community with reporting 
any misdelivery of water nearby. If managers 
were found guilty of mismanagement, a 
democratically appointed middleman—
backed by the local Village Committee— 
would identify a different manager for that 
portion of the canal until the next incident. 
A similar system of distributed responsibility 
and participation in monitoring existed for a 
network of privately-built, but collectively-
used, water wells widely accessible 
throughout the community. In essence, people 
from this area of Yunnan were managing the 
local water supply as a common resource and 
were doing it effectively. This system was 
run as a service to the community and not for 
profit. Rules to punish overdrawing had also 
been in force at some point, but were later 
abandoned as state officials took charge over 
environmental issues.
The Activation of 
Ineluctability
What is most surprising is not that local 
people were aware and had extensive 
experience of cooperating on water 
management well before anyone from the 
outside had instructed them on the matter. 
Rather, the surprising bit of this story is that 
local farmers were willing to accept the co-
optation of their distributed and equitable 
mechanism of organised water delivery. 
This, at the hands of a system that promised 
nothing except increased levels of corruption, 
higher overall running costs, and dwindling 
state support.
Indeed, the language of techno-politics is 
successful because it activates a particular 
explanatory framework that resonates among 
the people—that of the moral superiority of 
scientific management. Farmers would assert 
that countryside life was bound to disappear 
in China and that rural dwellers had to adjust 
to a different lifestyle or migrate elsewhere. 
In their opinion, the previous system was 
backward and not keeping pace with more 
scientific forms of management represented 
by the WUAs. While a few younger informants 
held the view that locals should collectively 
resist the government or businesses 
whenever water was taken away or polluted, 
in general the water sector reformers had 
been quite successful in framing the problem 
of sustainability exclusively as one of science 
and supervision. The idea of governing water 
‘the old way’ (laoguiju) was thereby made 
redundant—a survival component of an 
important, but now technically disposable, 
condition of pre-scientific Chinese water 
management. As mentioned above, one key 
idea of the notion of the Commons is that 
of inclusive participation in the decision-
making process concerning the management 
of natural resources. As this power seemingly 
fades away from north-east Yunnanese 
communities, so is the sense of meaningfully 
being part of one’s community and the 
capacity to care for it. The Rancierian gesture 
I resorted to here was to acknowledge the 
unrecognised capacity of local Chinese 
people to challenge the tacit ordering and 
distribution of the things we have in common 
in counter-paradigmatic ways. As one Italian 
water referendum campaigner used to say 
during activists’ assemblies: ‘They want to 
convince us we don’t care about how water 
gets delivered.’ My ethnography shows 
that it is about time we start to re-convince 
ourselves of the contrary.
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Treating the environment as a common resource 
often implies not only local, but also supra-
local, even global, collectives of concerned 
stakeholders. While engaging with local actors, 
these stakeholders frequently insist on the 
need for a ‘professional’ approach. Examining 
an international project aimed at introducing 
biologically diverse agroforestry in a county 
in southwest China, this essay describes a 
more ‘amateur’ approach adopted by one 
international organisation. It argues that this 
amateurism demonstrates that, even within 
global professional organisations, there is an 
appetite for a new, more spontaneous, approach 
that values local knowledge and practices.
Amateurism and Our 
Common Concern 
for Biodiversity
Treating the environment as a common 
resource often implies not only local, but 
also supra-local, even global collectives of 
concerned stakeholders. The Convention 
on Biological Diversity, for example, asserts 
that ‘the conservation of biological diversity 
is a common concern of humankind’. An 
agroforestry project in Qingshan township, 
Yunnan province, was one such effort to 
establish the environment and biodiversity as 
a common concern for a global community of 
actors.  
A Western cosmetics company, Metelli, 
sponsored the project. Launched about 
a decade ago, the project’s goal was to 
introduce ecologically complex, biologically 
diverse agroforestry to Qingshan. According 
to a Metelli corporate social responsibility 
officer, since the company’s products depend 
on nature for their ingredients, Metelli has a 
responsibility to give back to the environment. 
Here, Metelli sees itself as a responsible 
stakeholder alongside local communities, and 
attempts to insert itself as a collaborator in 
the management of Qingshan’s environmental 
commons. 
This article is based on two years’ participant 
observation at the Institute for Farms and 
Forests (IFF), an international agricultural 
research organisation who participated 
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Reforestation on the Way Back to Lijiang. 
Photo: Vincent Liu.
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in the project. Inspired by critiques of 
academic professionalisation, and associated 
explorations of the virtues of amateurism, I 
describe the amateur engagement that IFF 
attempted to bring to this project. I argue 
that this amateurism demonstrates that, even 
within global professional organisations like 
IFF, there is an appetite for what Anna Tsing 
calls ‘creat[ing] scenes that exceed or escape 
professionalization.’  
Pursuing Amateurism
To implement Metelli’s vision for Qingshan, 
several organisations were recruited. First, a 
Western NGO with experience in agroforestry, 
Arboreus, and a local NGO called Shehui. 
Several years into the project, Metelli and 
Arboreus had become concerned by Shehui’s 
lack of agri-environmental expertise. IFF was 
therefore recruited to the project, bringing 
with it its experience in agroforestry and soil 
management. In contrast to the other project 
partners, IFF’s involvement was rather 
informal. IFF had a lucrative contract with 
Metelli to facilitate laboratory research on 
local medicinal plants with the potential for 
use in cosmetics. As such, when they offered 
assistance to Metelli’s Qingshan project, IFF 
asked only for funds to cover travel expenses. 
The resulting absence of the kind of formal 
deliverables that ordinarily tie IFF’s funding 
promised IFF scientists an unusual degree of 
latitude. 
Having provisionally devised soil 
management practices for Qingshan, and 
established participatory principles according 
to which these ideas should be communicated, 
the IFF team (of which I was a member) ran 
several workshops in Qingshan. While IFF’s 
enthusiasm for ‘participation’ embraced a 
central tenant of contemporary development 
professionalism, IFF’s designs for the project 
were out of sync with certain contemporary 
trends. First, Qingshan workshops were each 
designed from scratch and as unique events. 
Workshops did not adhere to a previously 
established protocol, nor did IFF staff 
imagine their workshops to be replicable on 
a wider scale. This contrasted with certain 
other projects where IFF employed protocols 
or ‘toolkits’ that had been designed to be 
transferable across time and space. 
Second, IFF scientists envisioned the 
process of learning from Qingshan farmers 
and getting to know the landscape over which 
they sought to establish a common concern 
as a slow and gradual process. Workshops 
were organised sporadically, and in response 
to the project as it unfolded. Each visit was 
approached as a further opportunity to learn. 
This contrasts with certain iterations of 
participatory rural appraisal (PRA) delivered 
as rapid, one-off workshops. In such versions 
of PRA, Terry Rambo suggests, development 
professionals ‘claim to understand everything 
by sponsoring a three-to-four-day rapid 
appraisal exercise’. Here, participation is 
co-opted by the very forms of professional 
‘arrogance’ Robert Chambers intended for it 
to address. 
In the Qingshan case, far from the 
‘understanding [of ] everything’ promised 
by certain PRA toolkits, IFF scientists’ ad 
hoc workshops created a degree of anxiety. 
Whereas transferable toolkits often imply 
a certainty in what should be done, the IFF 
team were at each stage anxious as to whether 
their ad hoc activities would perform as 
hoped: Had we really generated a space for 
dialogue, or were farmers simply telling us 
what we wanted to hear? Would the proposed 
soil management strategies really benefit 
Qingshan? In this respect, whereas scientists 
are often accused of adopting ‘technologies 
of hubris’, the anxieties generated by IFF’s ad 
hoc approach suggest the seeds of what Sheila 
Jasanoff calls ‘technologies of humility’.
If contemporary research and development 
professionalism is characterised by 
replicability, scalability, transferability, 
rapidness, and self-confidence; I am going to 
describe the ad hoc, single-site, one-off, slow, 
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anxiety-inducing, and often deeply personal 
engagement that IFF pursued as a form of 
amateurism. 
The Project Falls Apart
A soil management plan developed at an 
early workshop was for winter cover crops 
to be planted in-between the rows of not-
yet-harvested primary crops. Susanna, an 
IFF soil scientist, had proposed this early 
planting strategy as a solution to the farmers’ 
experience that cover crops did not survive 
Qingshan’s dry winters. When it came to 
the appropriate time to sow cover crops, 
however, we discovered via Shehui’s local 
project manager, Xuejian, that the farmers 
had decided to delay planting until after 
harvest. According to Xuejian, since the 
rains in Qingshan had begun very late that 
year, farmers expected that rains would also 
finish later than usual. As such, the farmers 
reasoned, they could afford to postpone cover 
crop planting until after harvest.
When this message was relayed to Susanna 
she was dismayed. She feared that the rains 
might not continue late, and having persuaded 
Qingshan farmers to give cover crops another 
try, she did not want them to fail. Susanna 
and her colleagues, moreover, were frustrated 
that Shehui had taken several weeks to inform 
IFF of the farmers’ new approach. In this 
respect, IFF’s attempt to situate itself within 
a larger collective was challenged by the fact 
of its exclusion from a significant decision-
making process. In a sense, this exclusion 
denied IFF’s implicit claim on Qingshan’s 
biodiversity as an object of common concern.
IFF’s response was to organise a further 
workshop in Qingshan. The difficulties in 
making this workshop happen, however, 
came from beyond Qingshan. IFF had 
initially arranged a workshop directly 
with a community leader in Qingshan, 
but Xuejian contacted IFF to cancel the 
workshop. Shortly thereafter, we received 
a communication from Arboreus explaining 
that all IFF activities in Qingshan must be 
pre-approved by both Shehui and Arboreus. 
The workshop did eventually go ahead, but 
following the workshop, wrangling continued 
amongst Shehui, Arboreus, and IFF. Whereas 
IFF scientists had anticipated and embraced 
the practical and ethical challenges of 
establishing relations with Qingshan farmers, 
the unexpected labour of maintaining 
relationships with extra-local partners 
emerged as an impossible headache. 
Some IFF colleagues attributed the project’s 
failure to the incompetence of their project 
partners. In one instance, Xuejian explained 
to IFF scientists that Arboreus’s training in 
Qingshan had attempted to impress upon 
farmers the importance of three metre 
spacing between trees—a guideline, Xuejian 
told us, that took no account of tree species 
or location. For IFF scientists, this absurdly 
global approach to tree propagation confirmed 
Arboreus’s ignorance. The failure of the 
collaboration, however, can also be attributed 
to an incongruity between the approaches 
of IFF and its project partners. As well as 
their incompetence, Arboreus’s tree-spacing 
guidance showed their professionalism: 
it reflected their understanding of 
environmental sustainability as a global, 
scalable process.  
Embracing development professionalism, 
Arboreus were constantly contemplating how 
their activities might be replicated across 
ever-larger scales. Indeed, this was part of the 
reason they wanted not only prior notification 
of IFF’s activities, but also written reports 
after each visit to Qingshan. On one occasion, 
impressed by a soil management booklet 
Susanna had produced specifically for 
Qingshan farmers, Arboreus asked whether 
IFF might create a similar set of booklets for 
them to use globally.
IFF, by contrast, approached the project 
much more narrowly: as a project in Qingshan. 
We were seldom distracted by the question 
of how to replicate or upscale activities in 
Qingshan. This is not to say that IFF is not 
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ordinarily subjected to such imperatives. 
At a recent regional planning meeting, for 
example, an IFF communications officer 
described how the organisation must learn 
from marketing professionals and build a 
global brand for itself. Many IFF staff members 
were uncomfortable with such demands. 
Indeed, part of the Qingshan project’s appeal 
to IFF staff was perhaps that it presented an 
opportunity to work outside of this global 
scale and the accompanying imperatives of 
professional research for development. In 
this sense, the Qingshan project promised the 
chance to play the amateur.
By drawing attention to IFF’s amateurism I 
do not mean to imply that, unimpeded by their 
supra-local partners, IFF would inevitably 
have made the project a resounding success, 
or that amateurism escapes the contradictions 
and tensions inherent in efforts to make 
biodiversity a common concern in a world that 
is fundamentally unequal. Nevertheless, like 
China Scherz’s account of a Catholic charity’s 
refusal to adopt the logic of development 
donors, IFF’s all too brief flirtation with what 
I have called amateurism shows that, even 
within a prominent international organisation 
like IFF, there are seeds of activities that 
‘exceed or escape professionalization’.
A Victory for 
Professionalism
In this Qingshan case, however, Arboreus’s 
professionalism won through. Shortly after 
the shambles of IFF’s negotiations to run 
a workshop, Arboreus commissioned an 
audit of the project. One outcome of the 
audit was for Metelli to belatedly act upon 
an IFF suggestion to establish experimental 
agroforestry plots in Qingshan. IFF responded 
with a detailed proposal for the plots, but 
some at IFF half hoped Metelli would decline 
to fund the proposal, and thereby give IFF 
an excuse to leave the project. The headache 
of collaboration with supra-local partners 
had led to a loss of faith in the project ever 
running smoothly. Moreover, the professional 
imperatives to formalise project plans and 
project goals, as well as to undergo audits and 
manage budgets, robbed the project of the 
amateur quality that had initially sparked IFF 
staff ’s now fading commitment to, and hope 
in, the project.
Transferring on a flight back to the United 
Kingdom after completing fieldwork, I 
spotted photos of farmers planting trees 
in Qingshan displayed at a Metelli airport 
concession. As an example of Metelli’s 
corporate social responsibility, the display 
invited consumers to share in Metelli’s 
concern for global biodiversity. In effect, 
the invitation to purchase Metelli cosmetics 
was also an invitation to join the collective 
the company had established with Qingshan 
farmers, and to thereby participate in the 
sustainable management of environmental 
commons. Of course, from the point of view 
of IFF scientists, this collective and its 
management of Qingshan’s biodiversity had 
been no great success. Metelli’s marketing 
strategy, however, may serve as a reminder 
that just as challenging as it can be to 
establish meaningful collaborations around 
environmental commons, constructing the 
façade of a global collective can be rather 
easy. Indeed, in an era where organisations 
like IFF are turning to marketing in their 
efforts to professionalise, we should perhaps 
wonder if environmental commons would be 
better off in the hands of amateurs.
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This short essay tells the story of 
Dongxiaokou, an urban village in the northern 
outskirt of Beijing, infamously known in the 
press as the ‘waste village’ (feipincun). Until 
urban redevelopment projects accelerated 
its demolition in recent years, this informal 
settlement had been one of the biggest in the 
metropolis. Situated between the Fifth and 
Sixth ring road, around ten kilometres from 
the city centre, it hosted a massive population 
of migrant workers, who had made this place 
their home and used it as a base to enter the 
Chinese capital’s labour market.
The story of Dongxiaokou provides 
interesting insights into the process of 
commodification of land in contemporary 
China. The article engages with this issue and 
highlights, in particular, the tension between 
land used as a common resource by migrant 
workers and land utilised as a way to produce 
economic profits for real estate development. 
There are at least two good reasons why this 
story is worth telling—one related to the 
status of land use rights in China; the other 
to the nexus between labour and migration 
in the country. This account of Dongxiaokou 
Carlo Inverardi-Ferri
This essay outlines the development of 
Dongxiaokou, an urban village on the outskirts 
of Beijing. Until urban redevelopment projects 
accelerated its demolition in recent years, this 
informal settlement was home to a massive 
population of migrant workers, who had made 
this place their base for entering the capital’s 
labour market. The story of Dongxiaokou 
provides interesting insights into the process 
of commodification of land in contemporary 
China. In particular, it highlights the tension 
between land used as a common resource by 
migrants, and land utilised as a way to produce 
economic profits for real estate development.
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Commons and the 
Right to the City in 
Contemporary China
Urbanisation on the outskirts of Beijing. Dongxiaokou, late 2014.
Photo: Carlo Inverardi-Ferri
reasserts the centrality of an old question: in 
a geography where capitalism brings about 
a growing commodification of space, who 
owns the right to the city? In other words, 
if we consider the urban space as a common 
resource, who has the right to use it and 
under what conditions?
Land Rights and Migrant 
Labour
Surprisingly enough, while in the last 
decades China has undergone a number 
of subsequent shifts towards economic 
liberalism, land somehow remains a 
conundrum for the country’s ‘socialist market 
economy’. While land has certainly been 
subjected to the effect of the marketisation of 
the economy, it has also remained strictly tied 
to the Party-state. Today there are two main 
types of land property rights in China. While 
urban land is formally owned by the state, 
rural residents exercise collective ownership 
in the countryside. In theory, rigid regulations 
control the use of this resource; in practice, 
however, ambiguity in the legislation has 
resulted in an empowered Party-state, which 
has ended up holding sway on land-related 
decisions in both cities and countryside.
A common practice in many rural villages 
involves the development of collectively-
owned land into urban and commercial 
functions as a way for local administrations 
to create new streams of revenue. While 
some localities have been more successful 
than others, this phenomenon has appeared 
almost everywhere in the country. In 
particular, these practices have multiplied 
in border areas between the city and the 
countryside, where many rural villages 
have been completely transformed in their 
geographies. This rural-urban friction has 
also led to another phenomenon driven by 
the increasing marketisation of the economy 
and the process of commodification of land. 
The sprawling of metropolises into suburban 
areas has resulted in the recurrent inclusion 
of rural villages into urban districts. Rural 
land is thus subjected to a two-fold process 
of commodification. First, it is informally 
developed into urban and commercial 
functions as a means to make a profit for rural 
areas. Second, these hybrid spaces are again 
subsumed by urban redevelopments.
The story of Dongxiaokou, a small rural 
village that in a few years became one of the 
largest informal settlements in the Chinese 
capital, is particularly revealing of both 
dynamics. In the early 2000s, the village 
rented most of its land to migrant workers 
coming from outside the municipality of 
Beijing. Its proximity to the city centre made 
it a convenient place to settle down and 
find work opportunities in the metropolis. 
When the first migrants arrived, local cadres 
welcomed them and accommodated the 
newcomers in uncultivated fields, which were 
rented out as a way to drive new revenues 
into the village.
Wealthy migrants rented big plots of land 
that they then divided and sublet to less 
well-off migrants, who in turn established 
their dwellings and economic activities 
in Dongxiaokou. Very quickly the village 
population grew from little less than two 
thousand people into an agglomeration, 
according to some sources, of almost thirty 
thousand inhabitants. Interestingly, 
Dongxiaokou quickly became a local hub for 
waste recycling activities growing in scale 
and scope. As one of my informants claimed 
in a personal communication, in few years 
Dongxiaokou was transformed into ‘one of 
the biggest scrap distribution centres (feipin 
jisandi) in the entire country.’
A complex network of buyers and suppliers 
for all sort of waste materials developed in 
the village. During the day, local recyclers 
roamed the wealthy neighbourhoods of 
Beijing in search of valuable products, such 
as used mobile phones or old compressors. In 
the evenings, they came back to Dongxiaokou 
to resell their products to middlemen who, in 
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turn, resold them to manufacturing companies 
in nearby regions. A large number of 
complementary businesses, such as mechanic 
workshops, logistics firms, groceries, and 
restaurants, also quickly flourished in the 
village. 
Hundreds of family-owned enterprises 
dominated the landscape. They all looked 
more or less the same. Behind a metallic 
gate was a rectangular courtyard where old 
newspapers, waste wood, plastic bottles, 
used electronics, or anything else with a 
commercial value was stored. In one of the 
corners of the yard there was always a small 
building, usually composed of two rooms, 
where an entire family lived. Sometimes a dog 
was chained to one of the walls to guard the 
yard.
A New Generation of Petty 
Capitalists
Interestingly, while academia and the 
media have paid much attention to different 
generations of migrant workers in their role 
as wage-labourers, the rise of Dongxiaokou 
paints a less familiar picture. It tells the 
story of small family-owned firms and 
self-employed entrepreneurs, or in other 
words, petty capitalists. It is a story of 
what some define as the informal economy: 
a heterogeneous sector that crosses many 
different industries, and employs a large 
proportion of the population in contemporary 
China. It is not my goal to romanticise this 
phenomenon, which raises serious questions 
of occupational health and safety, as well as 
issues of local citizenship and environmental 
justice, but rather to underline what I believe 
to be one of its most peculiar characteristics. 
Migrants in Dongxiaokou—at least a good 
portion of them—enjoyed a relatively high 
level of freedom and mutual support, being 
part of a local society that conceived of their 
resources—labour and land—as means of 
common subsistence.
Dongxiaokou was not an isolated case. A 
report by the United Nations published in 
2013 estimated that the informal recycling 
sector in China comprised twenty million 
people, and that it was organised in a myriad 
of informal settlements scattered all over 
the country. While numbers certainly cannot 
give an accurate account of the great variety 
of businesses that this industry creates, they 
are nevertheless useful to provide a general 
idea of the magnitude and impact that 
these activities had, and continue to have, 
on Chinese metropolises. This involves the 
creation of employment opportunities on 
the one side, and the production of physical 
landscapes on the other side.
Dongxiaokou was not a new phenomenon 
either. In their work on the ‘Henan village’, 
Béja and colleagues documented the 
emergence of these urban and economic 
spaces as far back as the 1990s. The authors 
analysed a settlement not too far from Peking 
University—now long demolished—in many 
ways similar to Dongxiaokou. They did so 
through the notion of desakota (desa meaning 
‘village’ and kota ‘urban’ in Bahasa), a concept 
that was first employed in studies on the 
urbanisation of Southeast Asian countries. 
In Indonesia, the metropolitan sprawl had 
produced a peculiar combination of rural and 
non-rural activities, where areas dedicated to 
the production of rice were mixed with the 
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urban landscape. Drawing a parallel with the 
Indonesian context, the authors described the 
Henan village as a peculiar Chinese desakota.
The fate of Dongxiaokou was decided in 
the 2000s. This space on the urban periphery, 
which had been transformed through the 
agency of a group of migrant workers, and 
which provided a fundamental service to the 
city—waste recycling—did not resonate with 
the conceptions of modernity that official 
planners held for Beijing. When urbanisation 
reached the borders of Dongxiaokou, space 
had to be made for the new real estate projects. 
As a result, demolitions of the ‘waste village’ 
of Dongxiaokou accelerated in 2015. The place 
that previously buzzed with economic activity 
was again geographically transformed. 
Workshops that were filled with all sort of 
valuable products became empty fields, as 
their occupants had to relocate to other parts 
of the city. Roads were silent, except for the 
sounds coming from the new infrastructural 
works planned by the municipality. Having 
lost their usual clientele, shops closed down, 
and most dwellings were levelled.
A Social Community
As the story of Dongxiaokou suggests, two 
different levels of urbanisation exist in 
contemporary China. The first is a process 
mediated by the state that operates inside 
the administrative boundaries of the city; the 
second is an unofficial one, which goes beyond 
these boundaries and occurs at the margins 
of the metropolis or in the countryside. Here, 
migrant workers, attracted by the possibility 
of improving their material lives, enter 
Chinese metropolises and create particular 
urban economic landscapes, while suburban 
villages benefit economically from their 
presence. Yet, official planning recurrently 
subsumes these spaces.
These different modes of urbanisation also 
mirror contrasting ways of creating and living 
in the city. Enclaves of informality—and the 
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specific use of land operated in urban villages—
reflect the way less-privileged groups make a 
livelihood, rather than a strategy to produce 
profits from land development. While they 
come from poorer rural regions and moving 
into metropolises, friendship and kinship 
networks support the adventures of these 
migrants who lack any basic formal right to 
the city. As a dweller in Dongxiaokou clearly 
pointed out, the social community that 
inhabited Dongxiakou provided important 
support to migrants. In his words: ‘Being here 
is like being back home… Like this, it is easier 
to do our business.’
As this quote suggests, urban villages are 
microcosms of people and relations that 
represents a social community and not only 
economic outcomes. Here the physical 
and social dimensions of land are strictly 
intertwined with the everyday livelihoods of 
the people that inhabit these spaces. Their 
redevelopment is thus a process that brings 
about a destruction of these communal 
spaces, highlighting once more the need to 
ask an old—but urgent—question: who has the 
right to the city in contemporary China?
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Edwin Schmitt
The extraction and use of energy resources to 
drive modernisation has been one of the key 
concerns of the Chinese Communist Party. By 
tracing the history of coal mining in China, this 
essay argues that the physical characteristics 
of coal as a common pool resource have shaped 
the ways in which coal has been harvested and 
used, as well as the political and institutional 
structures that have developed around its 
governance.
Burning Coal in 
Tangshan: Energy 
Resources as 
Commons
While it is not always well recognised, energy 
reserves are by far the most abundant and yet 
most conflict-ridden common resource. In 
this essay, I will look at the common pool of 
energy resources in China, specifically coal 
mining and coal-fired power plants. Perhaps 
the most famous description of the commons 
comes from Garrett Hardin’s deceptively 
simple rendition: in order to prevent the 
ruin of common resources, society requires 
a set of rules for harvesting those resources 
so that they can be put to use. Originally the 
debate was about whether the most optimal 
rules could be found through a free market 
or a planned economy, the latter of which is 
the direction that China took. Elinor Ostrom 
provided a third insight into the debate, 
arguing that the form these rules could take 
was not that important as long as they were 
embedded into the everyday practices of a 
society. 
Although he does not couch his argument 
in terms of the commons, Timothy Mitchell 
has recently argued that the physical 
characteristics of an energy resource has a 
strong relationship with the way these rules 
might develop and become socially embedded. 
According to Mitchell, democratic politics 
initially became entrenched in Europe during 
the Industrial Revolution as a result of the 
need for coal miners to collaborate together 
while deep underground to safely remove 
this energy resource from the earth. These 
strong collaborative relationships became 
essential when coal miners, as well as those 
responsible for transporting the coal from 
mine to factory, went on strike. The dense 
physical characteristics of coal allowed 
striking workers to ensure that the flow of 
energy, and therefore the flow of economic 
development, would grind to a standstill. 
This collaborative nature that emerged in the 
mines was a natural pairing with democratic 
politics when workers began to unionise and 
demand better conditions and pay from the 
capitalist owners of the mines.
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The Early Democracy of 
Chinese Miners: Anyuan vs. 
Kaiping
Mitchell’s history of coal begs the question: 
why did similar democratic principles not 
emerge among coal miners in China? In some 
ways they did, at first. One of the most famous 
examples comes from the Anyuan Mines, 
Jiangxi province during the 1920s where the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) planted 
the seeds of the Communist Revolution. It 
was the collaborative nature of the miners 
that allowed the Party to develop Anyuan 
into a kind of ‘worker’s university’ for 
disseminating strategies for unionising and 
calling worker strikes around China. Many 
of the principles practiced at Anyuan were 
rooted in democratic principles of equality 
while, of course, also being embedded within 
a Marxist-Leninist ideological call for class 
struggle. After attacks by the Kuomintang, 
the workers were forced to abandon the mine 
but ended up forming the First Red Army 
of China. As we will see, this militarisation 
of the workers had consequences for why 
China’s coal miners eventually organised in a 
manner that does not fit Mitchell’s narrative. 
While the miners in Anyuan were initially 
democratic, workers at the Kaiping Mines in 
Tangshan, located in Hebei province, were 
suppressed by a capitalist and colonialist 
system of exploitation. Most of China’s early 
industrial labour force was recruited from 
rural populations far from industrial centres. 
It was up to a group of labour contractors 
(batou) to bring workers and owners together, 
but this created an effective barrier that often 
prevented the British owners of the mine from 
ever hearing the needs of their workforce. A 
strict hierarchy at Kaiping ensured that the 
rules and decisions made for governing the 
mining of coal received little or no input from 
those labouring to remove the energy source 
from the earth. 
In late 1948, Tangshan was ‘liberated’ from 
the rule of the Kuomintang by an elite unit of 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). As a first 
order of business, two high-ranking officers, 
Li Chenglong and Yan Dakai, respectively 
took control of the Tangshan Electric Plant 
and the Kailuan Coal Mine (the new name 
for the Kaiping mines). At that stage, it was 
imperative for the PLA to quickly revive the 
productive forces that would ensure a stable 
supply of weaponry to the military. Tangshan 
was not only a centre of energy production, 
but it also produced military vehicles needed 
to keep the PLA mobile as the CCP cemented 
its power across China. Since there were 
no CCP members at the power plant, Li 
Chenglong spent the first two years focussed 
on indoctrinating the plant workers into a 
socialist mode of production. While workers 
were considered equal ‘owners’ of the plant, 
Li installed a new hierarchy for organising 
decision-making, by establishing worker’s 
brigades that had to answer to their brigade 
leaders, who in turn had to answer to the 
plant leader. This institutional hierarchy, 
mimicked that found within the PLA. 
Moreover, scientific and engineering 
brigades were established, so that educated 
elites were integrated into the decision-
making process of the plant. Regarding energy 
production, the plant leader took the input of 
scientists and engineers quite seriously. While 
the plant leader oversaw day-to-day decision-
making, the amount of energy produced and 
supplied to the electrical grid was a decision 
made by the Tangshan Electrical Bureau in 
consultation with the goals established by the 
Ministry of Water Conservancy and Electric 
Power of Hebei province and the Central 
Government. While this was certainly a new 
hierarchy, the fact that decisions on these 
matters were being made far away from the 
plant was nothing new to the workers. Similar 
processes were taking place at the Kailuan 
mine as well.
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The Rise of Chinese Unions
One major difference with the hierarchy 
found in the older batou system was the 
establishment of the worker’s unions. 
Although it was a country-wide union in 
name, the official All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions (ACFTU), was hardly a 
monolithic entity across China. At the 
grassroots level, both the Kailuan Coal Mines 
and Tangshan Electric Plant established 
unions that represented the workers of 
their respective facilities. These unions 
allowed the voice of the workers to be heard 
within the Party and could be considered an 
outgrowth of the ideas that developed during 
the Party’s time at Anyuan. Throughout the 
first thirty years of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), the unions created a certain 
level of antagonism that required the military 
hierarchy described above to cooperate with 
the workers through their union leaders. 
Moreover, the transmission of Party ideology 
was dependent on the unions and in some 
cases this would result in situations beyond 
the control of the plant leader. For instance, 
during the second Anti-Rightist Campaign 
of 1959, the workers forced Plant Leader Li 
Bin to resign and heavily criticised him for 
his supposed rightist positions regarding 
electricity production. It was not until 1962 
that he was forgiven, eventually becoming the 
plant leader for the duration of the Cultural 
Revolution. However, there were also times 
throughout the Great Leap Forward (1958–
1962) and Cultural Revolution (1966–1969) 
when ideological shifts provided the plant 
leader with exceptional power and forced the 
workers to commit to dangerous production 
quotas leading to multiple accidents. 
In other words, while a new hierarchy was 
put into place that still provided a degree of 
separation between the workers and decisions 
for harvesting and utilising energy resources, 
there was always a struggle between a group 
of decision-making experts and the workers. 
Perhaps the potential for a more democratic 
power structure did exist in early PRC 
history. However, we should also keep in 
mind that the workers’ unions were isolated 
within their work unit. The union at Kailuan 
Coal Mine was strictly focussed on providing 
a voice for the miners and had no control over 
where the coal mined from Kailuan would 
end up. The only real connection between the 
Kailuan Coal Mine and the Tangshan Electric 
Plant unions would be when the chairperson 
of the union or a few worker representatives 
might meet at the Hebei Provincial Worker’s 
Union Annual Conference. 
Multiple worker unions never collaborated, 
which is why the idea of a sector-wide strike 
preventing the flow of energy resources was 
unthinkable. In some ways, we might even 
argue that the ability of the state to ensure 
the flow of energy from the common pool of 
resources into the economy was at least as 
effective in this socialist military hierarchy 
as it ever was within the capitalist economies 
of Europe. Perhaps we could say that the 
institutionalisation of a military hierarchy for 
organising energy resource management that 
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Chairman Mao goes to Anyuan 
Liu Chunhua (1968)
included the ability of the union to provide 
workers with a voice was somewhat similar 
to the nested institutions described by 
Ostrom. 
A Model for Energy 
Management
Over the years, Tangshan’s energy 
production was presented as an institutional 
model to the rest of the country, not unlike 
the more (in)famous Daqing Oil Fields. 
Books were distributed to coal-fired power 
plants around the country with titles like 
‘The Situation of Tangshan Electric Plant 
Cadres Participating in Labour’. Both the 
Tangshan Electric Plant and the Kailuan 
Coal Mine regularly graced the pages of the 
People’s Daily, with the latter being praised 
for its success at implementing cutting-edge 
technology in removing coal from the earth. 
More recently, the messages have begun to 
shift after a plan to expand the plant was 
accused of violating environmental policies 
in 2007. Today, both the Kailuan Mine and 
the Tangshan Electric Plant have been shut 
down and turned into parks, similar to those 
discussed by Maris Gillette in this issue (see 
p. 25). Just a year ago, the People’s Daily 
even published a detailed article about the 
successful remediation process taking place 
at Kailuan Coal Mine. Even in ‘death’, the 
mine and the power plant are being used as 
examples to follow as China enters the new 
historical phase of ‘Ecological Civilisation’ 
(shengtai wenming).
Naturally, the top-down nature of Ecological 
Civilisation that ensured the decision to close 
the plant and mine had little to do with what 
the workers themselves wanted. What is 
ironic about this story is that the top-down 
hierarchical political structure from which 
the Ecological Civilisation ideology emerged 
originated with the need to ensure that the 
Chinese military had access to highly polluting 
energy resources, such as coal. Regarding the 
commons, we can see that a top-down method 
can be used to prevent access to common 
energy resources just as it can organise the 
harvest of them. My focus here has not been 
on the effectiveness of this hierarchical 
structure to manage those resources over the 
long term—others have already argued that it 
did a very poor job. Instead, I have been trying 
to show how a certain kind of social structure 
and political decision-making emerged from 
the hierarchical rules for governing common-
pool energy resources in China. While some 
aspects of democratic decision-making did 
find their way to China’s coal fields, the bonds 
between coal miners that Mitchell described 
in the European context were prevented 
from developing into a true political force 
because of the institutional structure of the 
CCP. In other words, the material aspects of 
the environment are not ineffectual when it 
comes to the rules we devise for governing the 
commons, but nor do they solely determine 
the structure of those rules or the political 
power needed to enforce them.
Edwin Schmitt
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This essay explores a particular kind of local 
viticulture in Tibetan communities in northwest 
Yunnan province. While mainstream wineries 
emphasise modernity at any cost without much 
concern for the environment, the rural Tibetan 
grape growers examined in this article pursue 
an ecologically-friendly agenda meant to 
protect ‘common’ sacred landscapes. Reasons 
for this choice include observations of chemical 
degradation of the land, Buddhist ethics, and 
new conceptions of how ethnic representation 
can be exemplified by more ecologically-friendly 
forms of commodity production.
Protecting Sacred 
Commons: 
Balancing Commodity 
Viticulture Economies 
with Ecological Health 
in Shangri-La
This essay explores a particular kind of 
local viticulture in Tibetan communities in 
China, which is different from mainstream 
wine industries within the larger Shangri-La 
area in northwest Yunnan province. While 
mainstream wineries are based on historical 
recreations of past missionary work and 
regional identities, and adopt narratives that 
emphasise modernity at any cost without 
much concern for the environment, the rural 
Tibetan grape growers whom I examine in this 
article pursue an ecologically friendly agenda 
meant to protect ‘common’ sacred landscapes. 
Reasons for this choice include observations 
of chemical degradation of the land, Buddhist 
ethics, and new conceptions of how ethnic 
representation can be exemplified by more 
ecologically friendly forms of commodity 
production. Recognition of these problems 
is meant to create what some villagers call a 
‘real Shangri-La or Shambala’, that is a place 
of divine serenity in Tibetan Buddhism. 
While government incentives aimed at 
supporting an emerging wine industry 
in Shangri-La through the promotion of 
new forms of agriculture and commodity 
schemes for growing grapes have tended to 
overlook ecological health and sustainability, 
awareness of such issues can be found among 
villagers. In some cases, these new state-
Wine village in Deqin, Yunnan.
Photo: South China Morning Post
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based schemes are altered and challenged 
at the grassroots to promote ecologically 
sound practices and healthy living meant to 
protect common landscapes and resources. 
In Deqin county, the area where I carried out 
my research, some individuals interested in 
sustainability and ecological health further 
adapted viticulture and wine to indigenous 
cosmologies to protect common sacred lands, 
which they view as belonging to everyone and 
worthy of preservation.
Though wine from Deqin county has been 
marketed as ‘natural’, ‘green’, and ‘ecological’, 
the emergence of this industry has actually 
led to widespread use of agricultural 
chemicals introduced by wine companies and 
government officials, the effects of which are 
not lost on local communities. To understand 
how villagers perceive these changes, in what 
follows I will analyse how they have developed 
their own understandings of concepts such as 
‘organic’ and ‘ecological’, and how these have 
been influenced by their Buddhist beliefs and 
their interest in preserving common sacred 
space. 
I will tell this story through the eyes of 
Ani Dom, one individual in Deqin county 
who has become recognised locally and 
even nationally for his environmental and 
community work. Given both its local and 
transnational environmental and religious 
significance as the home of Khawa Karpo, 
one of the most sacred mountains in Tibetan 
Buddhism, Deqin has produced many 
local environmental activists interested in 
preserving local cultures and ecosystems. 
Among them, Ani Dom from Bu Village, the 
site of a major winery, has dedicated particular 
attention to viticulture. Over my two years in 
the field between 2014 and 2016, I visited him 
and lived in his village on multiple occasions. 
Of Sacred Mountains, 
Buddhism, and Chemicals
I first met Ani Dom in 2014, shortly after 
arriving in Bu village. I planned to remain in 
the village for an extended period of time as 
it was the site of a large winery and a base 
for the production of sweet ice wine. On the 
day of my arrival, after my field assistant and 
I had made ourselves comfortable in a village 
home and were chatting with our host there, 
Ani Dom, an extremely talkative elderly man 
in a wide-brim hat with a beautiful stand 
of Tibetan prayer beads (mala) in his hand, 
appeared and explained that he had heard that 
a foreign visitor had arrived in the village. At 
that time and during many subsequent visits, I 
would listen to him talk about the region, the 
sacred mountain Khawa Karpo, Buddhism, 
the forest, his previous life as a hunter, and 
the horrible pollution that was occurring due 
to the chemicals used in viticulture. 
In my days in Bu Village, Ani Dom spent 
much time telling me about local Buddhist 
practices and the cosmologies surrounding 
Khawa Karpo, which is the name of both the 
mountain and the god after which the place is 
named. As a Buddhist with a deep reverence for 
life, the mountain, and the local environment 
and culture, Ani Dom regularly shared his 
strong feelings about viticulture and what he 
perceived as excessive agricultural pollution 
that was killing the mountain, its spirit, and 
the surrounding sacred landscape. However, 
Ani had not always been a Buddhist: it took a 
near-death and highly spiritual experience to 
turn him into a believer. Before 1986, he was 
known throughout Deqin as a great hunter, 
perhaps the region’s most famous according 
to his daughter Zhouma. That year, during a 
twenty-five-day sleepless trance brought on 
by a heart attack, he dreamed that the spirits 
of all the animals that he had killed had come 
back to exact revenge on him. In that vision, 
the god Khawa Karpo came to his rescue, and 
he then decided to devote the rest of his life 
to the preservation of the area. The god told 
him to throw his hunting dog in the river—
which he did—and he also turned in his gun 
to the police. 
Today Ani Dom’s life is quite different, 
47MADE IN CHINA - FOCUS
a matter of unending concern for his own 
family members and many other villagers 
in Bu, including the village leaders, who 
find him a nuisance for interfering in their 
economic activities in the wine industry. As 
the village chief explained to me, he really 
does not get along with Ani Dom due to his 
resistance against wine companies and their 
chemicals. As leader of the community, the 
chief is primarily concerned with income 
and livelihood, so he does not see anything 
wrong with the current practices of the wine 
industry.
A Mini-Environmental 
Movement in the Making
Today Ani Dom devotes all of his time 
to working with both international and 
domestic NGOs to preserve Khawa Karpo and 
the village environment. He is perhaps best 
known for his work protecting a sacred old 
juniper grove in the village, where he has 
also built a small temple dedicated to the god 
Khawa Karpo. He was able to do this mostly 
thanks to funding that he personally collected 
through donations from NGOs and Buddhist 
monasteries, but the village as a community 
also contributed a significant amount to the 
enterprise. Much of Ani Dom’s daily routine 
involves morning and evening walks to the 
temple to pray and perform circumbulations 
around it. These were the times when I would 
typically join him to discuss his ideas about 
Buddhist philosophy, conservation, and the 
changes brought to Deqin by viticulture 
and other forms of ‘modernity’. He had 
many stories about his work with various 
environmental and cultural NGOs and his 
Buddhist teachings, and every day he had 
something new to share. 
During my very first discussion with Ani 
Dom, he talked extensively about his various 
projects. He had recently set up a seniors’ 
association to protect both the environment 
and the grape plantations—the Khawa Karpo 
Traditional Knowledge and Ecological 
Conservation Association. One of the goals 
of the group was to teach villagers to plant 
grapes more organically and sustainably. A 
Hong Kong NGO sent an expert to help Ani 
Dom set up the organisation and provided 
some training on sustainable methods to 
grow grapes. As Ani Dom explained to me, the 
excessive use of pesticides for the grapes is 
very bad for walnuts and other fruit trees, and 
the soil has progressively degraded for many 
years. This is the reason why he is advocating 
for organic wine, against the wishes of his 
fellow villagers. In his own words:
Pesticides are harmful for the air, 
earth, soil, water, and all other forms of 
life beyond just humans. To care about 
these things is what traditional Buddhist 
philosophies teach us; all life is sacred. 
Before we planted grapes, our fruit and 
walnut trees were much healthier and 
now people even get skin diseases because 
they don’t know how to properly use the 
pesticides.
When I asked him what he thought about 
Shangri-La Wine and other local wines that 
were promoted and marketed as natural and 
as part of the Tibetan culture, he replied:
Grapes and wine are not part of the 
traditional Tibetan culture. This culture 
has been lost to the chemicals and waste 
that come with grapes. Grapes and wine 
are from foreigners. The grape production 
here in Bu village is low, but our quality 
is good. Buddhism promotes no-killing, 
so we are working to pilot grapes with no 
pesticides for people to enjoy.  
As for the future of the link between grapes 
and Tibetan identity in Deqin, he said: ‘If the 
usage of pesticides continues, things will be 
bad and the soil will be destroyed. I don’t 
think the grape industry is promising for 
Deqin’s future.’  
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Ani Dom’s story is illustrative of a mini-
environmental movement that grapes and 
viticulture have contributed to in Deqin. 
Some local people fear that most villagers 
in the region have fallen out of touch with 
Buddhism and local ecology in their pursuit 
of economic prosperity through chemically-
intensified grape production. Motivated by 
this overall concern for ecological health and 
Buddhist ethics, Ani Dom and a few others 
like him have launched their campaign against 
agrichemical use in viniculture. Indeed, in 
recent years they have worked quite actively 
with the Hong Kong NGO mentioned above 
to organise special training sessions on 
organic methods for grape vine care and 
pest management. To its credit, the NGO in 
its work with Ani Dom has done extensive 
research, even bringing experts familiar with 
organic methods used in Bordeaux to teach to 
villagers. 
Appeasing the Wrath of 
the Gods
Ani Dom regularly portends that the 
pollution coming from viticulture makes the 
god Khawa Karpo very unhappy. Evidence of 
his wrath includes the retreat of the Minyong 
Glacier, the mountain’s largest. While photo 
documentation shows that the glacier has 
been retreating for over eighty years, the 
rate of retreat continues to increase, which 
for Ani Dom is certain proof that the god is 
being harmed by both pollution and lack of 
devotion. Another example given by villagers 
of the dramatic consequences of failing to 
appease the god is a doomed attempt by 
Chinese and Japanese climbers to reach the 
summit of the mountain in 1991. Back then, 
an avalanche killed the entire expedition, 
a tragedy which was interpreted by local 
villagers as the response of the god Khawa 
Karpo to people trying to conquer his sacred 
domain.
Today, the quality of life and standard 
of living in Deqin are heavily driven by 
economic gains, more specifically by success 
in producing grapes. Major shifts have also 
taken place in the cultivation of crops such 
as wheat and barley, traditionally grown for 
subsistence and for religious and cultural 
practices. These are now being abandoned 
in exchange for more lucrative agricultural 
products. What is quite clear throughout 
Deqin, though, is that engagement with 
outside markets through agriculture and 
forest products is coming to redefine local 
perceptions of, and connections to, the 
Khawa Karpo landscape. In this context, the 
practices of Ani Dom and a few other villagers 
represent a form of resistance to these 
changes, an attempt to maintain a balance 
with Khawa Karpo and its spirit world to 
protect these sacred commons. 
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Mostly naked, friends and models of Ren 
Hang appear on a rooftop with skyscrapers as 
the backdrop, in a forest of tall trees, in a field 
invaded by wild grass, in a pond with budding 
lotuses, on a lonely rock hit by waves, or in 
a bathtub amongst swimming goldfish. Their 
naked bodies and limbs are neatly arranged 
as if they did not own them—an effect 
compounded by the deadpan expression on 
their young, pale faces. Labelled as ‘eroticism’, 
Ren’s photography could be considered 
sexual, since the sexual organs of these young 
men and women are either subtly hidden by 
odd props or directly confront viewers, but 
Ren saw it differently. In a 2012 interview, 
he said: ‘I don’t need to try to make it classy 
by calling it erotica. I don’t think there’s 
anything wrong with low class.’ 
Ren capitalised on a ‘low class’ approach 
in his early photography. Dressed in cheap 
bras, fish net stockings, dyed hair, and bloody 
red lips, his female prototypes could have 
just as easily been found in Yang Yong’s 
On 24 February 2017, photographer Ren Hang 
leapt to his death from a twenty-eight-floor 
building in Beijing. He had not yet turned thirty, 
but his work had already attracted considerable 
international attention. This essay retraces the 
path of Ren’s life, contextualising it within the 
rapidly developing field of Chinese photography. 
Beginning with the emergence of ‘private 
photography’ in China in the early 2000s, the 
article describes how a cultural industry made 
up of independent-publishing and photo fairs 
has blossomed in contemporary China.
All photos in these pages are taken from 
Ren Hang personal website and social media.
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early works on Shenzhen prostitutes, such 
as his series ‘Fancy in Tunnel’ (2001–2003). 
However, compared to Yang’s seriousness in 
questioning the lost identity of these female 
migrants when facing rapid urbanisation 
in south China, Ren’s ‘low class’ seemed 
indifferent.
Abandoning all clothes and dyed hair, Ren’s 
natural bodies spoke for themselves. ‘We 
were born nude… I just photograph things in 
their most natural condition,’ Ren explained. 
He said that he took up photography in 
2007, out of boredom, when he was studying 
advertising at a university in Beijing. With a 
Minolta point-and-shoot 35mm film camera, 
Ren photographed everything around him. 
Dorm-mates walking around undressed in the 
heat of Beijing’s summer became one of his 
early subjects. 
The Emergence of ‘Private 
Photography’ in China
The trend of casually photographing 
the everyday life of friends started with 
the emergence of the so-called ‘private 
photography’ (si sheying) movement in China 
at the turn of the millennium. Influenced 
by pioneers of ‘private photography’ in 
the United States and Japan—such as Nan 
Goldin and Nobuyoshi Araki—young Chinese 
photographers, led by Lin Zhipeng (also 
known as No. 223) in Guangzhou, embraced 
the unique tone of film at the exact moment 
when the world was celebrating digital 
technology. They decided to capture the 
spontaneity of fleeting moments all around 
them, which they used to express their 
indifference to the rest of the world.
Ren picked up on the trend of ‘private 
photography’ a few years later. Like Lin, 
he declined the responsibility of social 
concern, but at the same time he also rejected 
both Yang and Lin’s technique of casual 
composition of a photo. Ren’s snapshots were 
carefully choreographed and framed. Mostly 
positioned in the middle of the image, the 
bodies in his photographs were always shown 
in uncanny twists and bends. By displaying 
the meaningless non-functioning bodies as 
props for a shot, Ren seemed to give them an 
alternative life. These naked young men and 
women looked as if they were playing hide-
and-seek by climbing on trees. Pinching the 
skin of a neck or penis seemed childishly 
funny. Yet the flash from the point-and-shoot 
camera flattened these young faces and cast 
a layer of stark pallor on them. Influenced 
by the Japanese poet, film director, and 
photographer Shūji Terayama, Ren created 
slightly strange and ghostly atmospheres. The 
fact that he suffered from depression, which 
led him to have suicidal thoughts, might also 
explain the absurdity and the tint of death 
that seeped from his images. 
However, the absurd tone of his images is 
just right. The slender nude bodies, the young 
and fair faces, the out-of-context yet beautiful 
props form a fantasy that induces voyeuristic 
desire. The red lips and nails betray the 
‘naturalness’ that Ren claimed, and hint at 
a formula common in fashion photography, 
reflecting his advertising background. If 
taking photographs saved him from the 
boredom of studying advertising, advertising 
came back to him in his final years. Fashion 
brands such as Maison Kitsuné and Gucci, 
as well as fashion magazines such as Purple 
and Libertin Dune, commissioned Ren to 
photograph their new collections. His stark 
flashed images perfectly blended ‘private 
photography’ with more staged fashion 
photography, giving it a brand new arty look.
Photo Books and 
Independent Publishing
The nudity in Ren’s photos did cause some 
controversy. His website and exhibitions 
were shut down; once he was arrested while 
shooting outdoors. It sounds like a precarious 
existence, but it wasn’t. In China, this is a 
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well-trodden path. He was no rebel willing to 
test the bottom line of the government or the 
extent of acceptance of a conservative society. 
Indeed, at the margins of contemporary 
China’s controlled and moralised society, 
there remain many grey areas where legality 
is not enforced. While the police are intent 
to catch and suppress ‘dissidents’ aiming to 
mobilise disaffected populations, Ren was 
not one of them. He was just a self-made 
photographer. He publicised his photos on 
his website and social media accounts. He 
also self-published photo books. From 2011 
until his death, he produced sixteen books, 
some of them with a print run of up to five 
hundred copies. People could buy them in art 
bookstores and online. 
There are risks involved in this kind of self-
publishing in China. All books are supposed 
to have a formal publisher who gets an ISSN 
number and goes through the censorship 
process. Due to the fact that the censors 
would have probably characterised Ren’s 
photos as obscene, most official publishers in 
China would have never accepted his books. 
They belong to an alternative world that is 
teeming with life and creativity, and is often 
enmeshed with the new economy in ways that 
do not make it entirely incompatible with 
legality.
The cultural industry occupies a prominent 
position within this new economy. Listed 
for the first time as one of the main pillar 
industries by the State Council in 2009, the 
Ministry of Finance earmarked 4.42 billion 
yuan of special funds for its development 
in 2016. This has benefited first-tier cities 
like Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. For 
example, Shenzhen has become an important 
base for China’s cultural exports, with the 
value of its cultural and creative industry in 
2016 estimated at 194.97 billion yuan and an 
annual growth rate of eleven percent. The 
Shenzhen municipal government is also the 
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main supporter of alternative art festivals, 
such as the Fringe Festival and Here is Zine, 
Here is Shenzhen. 
Zines, short for ‘magazine’ or ‘fanzine’, are a 
small-run self-published medium, motivated 
by the need for self-expression rather than 
profit. Today’s zines all around the world have 
put on a new professional and fashionable 
look, and have gradually attracted numerous 
young fans even in China. Just as Su Fei and 
Guan Wei, owners of the first Chinese zine 
store BananaFish, explained: ‘[what we do] 
expresses a normal state and expectation 
of young people in China today…The idea of 
independent publishing’s “speaking out for 
oneself ”’ touches us.’ 
The photographs, poems, and diaries about 
his depression that Ren Hang published on his 
website perfectly espouse the unique spirit of 
zines. The fact that they come out in limited 
editions also gives zines some aura of hipness. 
‘Their freewill, extraordinariness, the feeling 
of sensibly fashionable exude some charm,’ 
said Eriko Obayashi, owner of POP Tame, a 
zine bookstore and art gallery in Tokyo.  In 
recent years, self-publishing photo-books has 
become part of this zine frenzy in China. In 
a time when every urban youth has a phone 
and is obsessed with sharing pictures of his 
or her life online, photography is possibly the 
most accessible and appropriate medium for 
zines. Photo-books now can be found online, 
in book stores, and especially in exhibitions, 
photo festivals, and photo fairs. 
From Shenzhen to the 
World
Ren Hang caught the wave of this rising 
hipness. While traditional publishing venues 
shut their doors, independent publishers at 
home and abroad welcomed his new brand 
of talent. Self-publishing enabled him to 
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have a specific public, more control over the 
printing process, and complete freedom in the 
selection of content. Beginning in Shenzhen, 
this trend of independent publishing has 
gradually spread to the rest of China. It seems 
ironic that the not-so-legal self-publishing is 
a growing part of the new economy that is 
being promoted by the Chinese authorities. 
However, in today’s China there exists more 
flexibility and freedom to meet new consumer 
demands in the cultural industry. Most 
importantly, by promoting relatively niche 
industries, as the Shenzhen government is 
doing, the Chinese authorities are able to 
project an open and inclusive image on the 
international stage, thus promoting Chinese 
soft power across the world.    
If Shenzhen leads the way with fringe 
festivals and zine fairs in China, Shanghai 
is on the frontline of photography. Besides 
the establishment of the Shanghai Centre of 
Photography in 2015, Shanghai held its third 
Photofairs Shanghai in September 2016, 
welcoming twenty-seven thousand visitors. 
More and more Chinese collectors are 
turning to photography due to the accessible 
price of works in limited-edition. ‘The 
market in China has greatly matured,’ said 
Alexander Montague-Sparey, the Artistic 
Director of Photofairs Shanghai, ‘and this 
has enabled us to present exciting, emerging 
artists from China and across the Asia-Pacific 
region.’ Ren Hang was exactly this type of 
exciting new artist. Although there is no 
report of his photos being sold at the fair in 
Shanghai, his works are highly prized among 
young photographers in China. Having been 
shown in more than twenty solo and seventy 
group exhibitions around the world, Ren’s 
art moved from gallery walls to museum 
walls—his two latest solos ‘Naked/Nude’ and 
‘HUMAN LOVE’ were launched earlier this 
year at the FOAM Museum in Amsterdam 
and Fotografiska Museum in Stockholm, two 
of the most important photo museums in 
Europe.  
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More and more young talents like Ren 
Hang have emerged in the last decade in 
China. A lot of these emerging photographers 
were educated in America or Europe, and 
are accustomed to a jetsetter lifestyle, 
flying between international cities for their 
life and work. Meanwhile, thanks to the 
growing domestic interest in photography, 
international photography festivals are 
mushrooming across China—such as the 
Pingyao International Photography Festival, 
the Lianzhou International Photo Festival, 
the China Lishui International Festival, Photo 
Beijing, the Caochangdi PhotoSpring, the 
Jimei x Arles International Photo Festival, 
etc.—each one of them attracting thousands 
of photo enthusiasts from home and abroad.  
Ren Hang’s works have attracted more 
attention overseas than in his home country. 
In February this year, Taschen published 
Ren Hang’s first and only international 
collection, which covers the work of his entire 
career. ‘The images are fresh, but also empty 
and superficial. They contain a deep sadness 
within,’ commented Ai Weiwei. Producing 
these superficial yet beautiful images with 
objectified young bodies might have slightly 
alleviated Ren’s deep internal sadness. In 
various interviews, he remarked about the 
pleasure he found while taking photographs, 
saying that it gave him a strong sense of 
existence. Ren actively fought his depression, 
but his condition made him full of despair. In 
one of his final posts on Weibo on 27 January 
2017—on the eve of the Chinese New Year— 
he said: ‘Every year my wish is always the 
same: to die earlier.’ On 24 February 2017, 
Ren leapt off a twenty-eight-floor building 
in Beijing, leaving behind his photos, his 
depression, a roaring fame, and the limelight 
of China’s buzzing creative industry. He had 
not yet turned thirty.
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Claiming sixty-nine thousand victims, the 
earthquake that hit Sichuan province on 12 
May 2008 not only took an enormous toll in 
human lives, but also had a major political 
impact in China. In his new book, Shaken 
Authority: China’s Communist Party and the 
2008 Sichuan Earthquake (Cornell University 
Press, 2017), Christian Sorace examines the 
political mechanisms at work in the aftermath 
of the tragedy. For this Academic Watch, we 
spoke with the author.
One of the most striking features of the 
aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake was 
the extraordinary showing of solidarity from 
Chinese and international civil society. In light 
of this, several scholars have hailed this event 
as a watershed for the relationship between 
state and society in China. Do you agree with 
this view?
Shaken Authority: 
China’s Communist 
Party and the 2008 
Sichuan Earthquake
CHRISTIAN SORACE: In the immediate 
post-quake aftermath, the unprecedented 
outpouring of compassion and volunteerism, 
the sudden rise of NGOs, and the open 
media coverage appeared to mark the long 
anticipated emergence of civil society in 
China. In hindsight, the momentary loosening 
of control appears to have been a mirage 
rather than a permanent reconfiguration 
of the relationship between the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and the people. 
The rebuilding of Sichuan was a showcase 
of Party legitimacy and not a platform for 
expanded civic participation. My book is 
about this top-down process and its effects 
on people’s everyday lives. I argue that 
the ‘emergence of civil society’ hypothesis 
was wrong on empirical grounds—a fact 
confirmed by the rise of Xi Jinping and the 
intensification of traditional Party methods 
of control. Conceptually speaking, I am also 
uncomfortable with this kind of research 
question. A researcher who sets out ‘in 
search of civil society’ may miss out on other 
dynamics and relationships of power that 
are visible without being recognisable. It is 
like the childhood book Where’s Waldo? The 
obsession with finding Waldo overshadows 
the intricate worlds happening around him. 
Especially in my field of political science, 
the so-called objective questions and debates 
are so deeply normative—it is somewhat 
astonishing. Why is China’s authoritarian 
regime ‘resilient’? When will it ‘collapse?’ 
Why hasn’t it ‘collapsed’? Why hasn’t ‘civil 
society’ emerged? As if ‘civil society’ was/is 
simply waiting for its moment to emerge. 
With reference to the title of your book, did 
the earthquake actually shake the authority of 
the Party in the areas hit by the disaster?
CS: Many of the earthquake survivors 
were angry with the Party’s reconstruction 
effort, but how do we interpret that anger? 
One of the things that surprised me was 
how high people’s expectations were for the 
ACADEMIC 
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CCP and state to provide them with support. 
Sichuan earthquake survivors demanded 
state provision of immediate relief, housing, 
and long-term economic security. These 
expectations were conditioned by post-quake 
propaganda, a history of Communist Party 
discourse, and engrained assumptions about 
state responsibility. My interviewees did not 
complain about the Party’s intervention into 
their lives; rather, they were disappointed 
and angry about the Party’s failed promises. 
One of the problems with the state-civil 
society paradigm is that it is premised 
on state-phobic assumptions that are not 
generally held by ordinary citizens in China—
people may be exhausted and fed up with 
the Party’s behaviour but recognise a need 
for its involvement in their lives. There was 
a politically incorrect joke circulating on 
China’s social media platforms while I was 
conducting fieldwork: ‘Many people actually 
view the government as their boyfriend: (1) 
Why don’t you pay attention to me? (2) Who 
needs you to pay attention to me? (3) You owe 
me an explanation! (4) I don’t need to hear 
your explanations. They are all lies!’ 
One of the most original aspects of your book 
is the attention that you pay to CCP ideas and 
discourse, which are usually discarded as mere 
propaganda. Why do you think it is important 
to listen to what the Party says in China today?
CS: The CCP has an extensive political 
vocabulary and set of concepts through which 
it understands the world. I take seriously 
Communist Party concepts like ‘formalism’ 
(xingshizhuyi), and conceptually grounded 
practices such as ‘investigation’ (diaoyan) 
and the ‘mass-line’ (qunzhong luxian), as 
conduits for understanding China’s political 
and social dynamics. We should not forget 
that China’s political system is based on a 
dialectical model that attempts to integrate 
theory (lilun) and practice (shijian), spiritual 
(jingshen) and material (wuzhi) development, 
and that the CCP considers itself a ‘learning 
party’ (xuexi dang) which is continually 
evolving and adapting to changing global 
and domestic contradictions (maodun). The 
CCP’s epistemological foundations shape 
how China’s political leaders act on the 
global stage, respond to domestic crises such 
as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, and govern 
on a day-to-day basis. If the CCP itself takes 
seriously language as a field of power and 
control, on what grounds can we dismiss it as 
empty propaganda? 
Among all the people you interviewed for 
your book, can you recall any encounter that 
left a mark on you?
CS: As a rule I never asked people about 
their personal traumas, but some people 
would inevitably want to discuss them. I had 
one conversation with a father who described 
to me in such vivid detail how he lost his 
wife and daughter during the earthquake. 
I couldn’t maintain the pretence of 
professionalism and continue the interview. 
We cried together, hugged, smoked cigarettes, 
and sat there in silence. That was probably 
the moment that I felt most painfully the 
ethical dilemmas of representation—of being 
a foreign academic, mining the ruins of 
other people’s lives for stories that will go 
in a book that will be the foundation of my 
academic career. One unforgettable image is 
the photograph of then Mianzhu county Party 
Secretary Jiang Guohua kneeling in front of 
a crowd angry parents who were marching 
to Sichuan’s capital Chengdu to protest the 
death of their children. This image of a Party 
official on his knees pleading with the people 
reveals a different dimension of power and 
state-society relations at work in China. It 
does not map onto the facile dichotomies 
of authoritarianism and democracy (or 
resilience/collapse paradigms) but indexes a 
complicated and fraught relationship between 
state morality and popular sovereignty at the 
basis of Communist Party rule. 
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